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Introduction
The intense political and economic turmoil in Venezuela throughout the administration of
Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro has engendered the most severe humanitarian crisis in the
Western Hemisphere today, an outflux of approximately 4.8 million refugees from the country
since 2014, and an international controversy over the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency.1 In the
aftermath of the contentious 2018 presidential election in Venezuela, opposition leader Juan
Guaidó contested Maduro’s authority and has received the political recognition of more than 50
countries that consider him Venezuela’s rightful president.2 This political dispute puts the
governments of countries such as the United States and several European countries, which have
recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president, at odds with the governments of countries like
Russia and China, which recognize Maduro.3 Amid such a crisis, governments, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have provided conflicting arguments
about how Venezuela’s political crisis should be resolved in accordance with international law.
To provide insights into the historical and theoretical foundations of such discordant
arguments, this thesis analyzes the political writings of the sixteenth-century Spanish friar
Bartolomé de las Casas, whose denunciations of Spanish treatment of indigenous peoples during
colonization efforts in the Caribbean addressed international legal questions relevant to the
present-day Venezuelan crisis. Las Casas’s writings offer insights into the historical precedents
behind the international legal arguments that governments and international organizations invoke
concerning Venezuela. Also, Las Casas’s political thought articulates a perspective on

“Venezuela crisis: How the political situation escalated,” BBC, last modified January 13, 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36319877.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
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international legal questions that can be used to support or critique the arguments and policies of
governments, international organizations, and NGOs concerning the Venezuelan turmoil. Las
Casas’s arguments against Spanish injustices toward Native Americans in the Caribbean are
especially pertinent to the study of the Venezuelan crisis because the ongoing political and
economic strife in Venezuela leaves that country’s population at risk for potential crimes against
humanity. This possibility, and the questions it poses regarding Maduro’s legitimacy if he were
to carry out crimes against humanity against Venezuelan citizens, makes the study of
international legal and ethical questions such as those Las Casas posed all the more critical for
the study of the Venezuelan crisis.
The thesis seeks to determine how well twenty-first-century governments, international
organizations, and NGOs’ arguments and policy positions concerning the Maduro regime’s
parallel themes from Las Casas’s writings. With a recognition of the differences in the historical
contexts of Las Casas’s day and the current Venezuelan crisis, the paper aims to find to what
extent Las Casas’s political thought aligns with twenty-first-century governments’ justifications
for international interventions. The document uses the term “international interventions” to refer
to governments’ efforts to exert influence on the direction of political changes in another country
– especially when the country in question is in crisis. Thus, the thesis speaks of international
interventions in a broader sense than as a reference to governments’ or international
organizations’ military involvement in armed conflicts within other countries’ territories. To
provide helpful historical and theoretical context for Las Casas’s views on international
interventions as defined in this broader sense, this analysis compares his political thought with
that of two other sixteenth-century Spanish writers. Like Las Casas, these writers – Francisco de
Vitoria and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda – sought to answer pressing legal and ethical questions
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concerning Spanish colonization in the Americas. The arguments these two writers employed to
address these questions illuminate Las Casas’s views in greater detail through comparisons and
contrasts, providing a more nuanced understanding of how Las Casas’s political thought fit into
the international legal theories of his day. The writings of Vitoria in particular have wielded great
influence on the development of international legal thought on state sovereignty, as well as
“modern constitutionalism, subjective rights, and imperialistic discourse.”4 The thesis focuses on
Las Casas’s thought and analyzes the writings of Vitoria and Sepúlveda to a secondary degree in
part because Las Casas’s political thought tends to be related less directly than that of Vitoria to
international legal principles of sovereignty and international interventions that apply critically to
the Venezuelan crisis.5 Instead, Las Casas’s political arguments tend to be regarded more
commonly as critiques of oppression in colonization and imperialism, and these characterizations
of Las Casas’s thought are certainly justified.6 However, Las Casas’s political arguments provide
important insights for the study of sovereignty and international interventions as well, and this
study seeks to demonstrate the moral and practical applicability of certain views in Las Casas’s
writings to international efforts to address the Venezuelan crisis. The thesis’s comparisons of Las
Casas’s arguments to those of Vitoria and Sepúlveda serve to articulate the differences in these
writers’ perspectives on sovereignty and international interventions, and they illustrate
particularly how certain views of Vitoria are more applicable to the circumstances of the
Venezuelan crisis than those of Las Casas and how other views of Las Casas are more applicable
to the Venezuelan crisis than those of Vitoria.
Toy-Fung Tung, “Vitoria’s Ideas of Supernatural and Natural Sovereignty: Adam and Eve’s Marriage, the Uncivil
Amerindians, and the Global Christian Nation,” Journal of the History of Ideas 75, no. 1 (January 2014), accessed
March 10, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/43289650, 46.
5
Ibid.
6
Bartolomé de las Casas, “An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies,” in An Account, Much
Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies, With Related Texts, ed. Franklin W. Knight, trans. Andrew Hurley
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), l.
4
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The document adopts a case-study approach to the study of the intersections between the
international legal and ethical arguments in Las Casas’s writings and the legal and ethical
arguments governments and international organizations employ in the context of the Venezuelan
crisis. The first section of the thesis elaborates on the context of the current Venezuelan crisis,
surveying its causes and how the crisis raises questions about international legal principles like
sovereignty and the responsibility to protect. These principles contribute to the ongoing
international disagreements among governments regarding the Maduro regime’s political
legitimacy. This section of the thesis provides explanations of sovereignty and the responsibility
to protect as international legal principles and norms, placing them in the context of legal
precedents and controversies. The second part of the thesis introduces Las Casas’s perspective on
sovereignty and concepts of just war theory. Just war theory examines the justifications for a
legally permissible war and whose principles can be applied to non-military efforts of
governments to influence political events in another government’s territory.7 This section of the
thesis seeks to provide crucial context concerning Las Casas’s political arguments that will prove
crucial for further analysis throughout the thesis.
The third segment of the thesis delves further into the evolution of views of sovereignty
and just war theory in international law. This part of the thesis compares and contrasts Las
Casas’s views of international interventions with the twenty-first century concept of the
responsibility to protect, which this section explains in detail. Furthermore, this section
introduces crucial comparisons of the political thought of Las Casas, Vitoria, and Sepúlveda that
are pertinent to the conclusions of the thesis. Following this discussion, the fourth section of the

Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” in Theorising the Responsibility to
Protect, edited by Ramesh Thakur and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 182, 186187.
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thesis applies international legal disputes over sovereignty, international intervention, and the
responsibility to protect to the Venezuelan crisis in particular, surveying the differing arguments
employed by governments, international organizations, and NGOs in support of Guaidó’s claim
to the Venezuelan presidency or in defense of Maduro’s hold on power.
The fifth part of the thesis examines the extent to which international legal arguments
concerning sovereignty align with Las Casas’s views on sovereignty. This section distinguishes
the historical contexts of Las Casas and the Venezuelan crisis, as well as the differences between
Las Casas’s views of sovereignty and those of twenty-first century governments. In a similar
manner, the sixth section of the thesis analyzes how well Las Casas’s political arguments that
relate to just war theory parallel present-day notions of the responsibility to protect that can be
applied to the Venezuelan crisis. The seventh component of the thesis elaborates on the key
takeaways from the fifth and sixth sections and presents the concluding arguments. The seventh
section of the thesis also outlines potential avenues in which this analysis can contribute to
further scholarly research, as well as promote more nuanced perspectives on the international
legal disputes surrounding the Venezuelan crisis.
The thesis argues that the legal and ethical principles on which governments,
international organizations, and NGOs have justified their support for Juan Guaidó and their
opposition to Maduro resemble Las Casas’s arguments concerning international law. However,
the thesis also argues that the means by which these international actors have supported Guaidó
in practice do not align with Las Casas’s perspective on international interventions. The thesis
concludes that Vitoria’s justification of certain international interventions bears greater moral
and practical applicability to the Venezuelan crisis than Las Casas’s rejection of political and
military intervention in a state, for intervention can pose a means to address human rights
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violations that may be perpetuated in an unjust status quo. At the same time, however, Las
Casas’s argument that international interventions should not lead to greater injustice than they set
out to alleviate and his skepticism toward unilateral interventions that were not sanctioned by a
higher international authority render his writings valuable to the analysis of the Venezuelan
crisis. In this same vein, Sepúlveda’s arguments are less applicable to the Venezuelan crisis in
particular since it is not clear that unilateral military interventions, which he championed in the
sixteenth century, would serve as an effective means of alleviating suffering in Venezuela.
Finally, the thesis argues in favor of a combination of Vitoria’s acceptance of international
interventions on a limited scope with Las Casas’s admonition to ensure international
interventions do not inflict more harm than they set out to correct. This combination provides
preferable moral and practical insights for international efforts to address human rights violations
in Venezuela.
I: The Venezuelan Crisis and International Legal Principles
While the current political and economic crisis in Venezuela has placed the country at the
center of current political discourse about potential human-rights abuses, political and economic
instability in Venezuela extends beyond the administrations of Hugo Chávez and Nicolás
Maduro. Venezuela’s vast oil revenues during the 1970s enabled the country to avoid the
economic difficulties that plagued many Latin American countries during that decade.8
Nevertheless, Venezuela’s dependence on oil exports made its economy particularly susceptible
to the rise and fall of the international price of oil, so when oil prices fell in the early 1980s,

Ronald D. Sylvia and Constantine P. Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon: Political Change in Venezuela,”
Third World Quarterly 24, no. 1 (2003), accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstororg.echo.louisville.edu/stable/3993630, 65.
8
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Venezuela’s currency also fell in value.9 All the while, the income from oil exports remained
concentrated in the hands of the Venezuelan upper classes, and political elites in the principal
parties – AD (Acción Democrática) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Electoral
Independiente) – used oil revenues to maintain their power through a spoils system.10 Faced with
declining living standards and increasingly disgruntled with the political elites’ growing
difficulties in providing rents to the citizenry amid the economic downturn, Venezuelans’
discontent exploded into violence during the Caracazo riots of 1989.11 In this context of
increasing political unrest, the leftist lieutenant colonel Hugo Chávez Frías conspired with
likeminded military officers to seize power in a coup, viewing with disgust the Venezuelan
military’s use of force against the Caracazo rioters.12
After failing to seize political power during a 1992 coup attempt, Chávez served two
years in prison until then-Venezuelan president Rafael Caldera released him in 1994.13 At that
point, Chávez’s political allies, particularly Luis Miquilena, convinced him to seek power
through the electoral process.14 Crafting a political message aimed to appeal to broad swaths of
the Venezuelan electorate, Chávez won the 1998 presidential election with support from the rural
and urban working classes as well as middle and upper-class voters.15 Chávez claimed to
represent the pueblo, or Venezuelan people, against so-called oligarchs whom he portrayed as

Ibid.; Jonathan Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?” in The Revolution in Venezuela: Social
and Political Change under Chávez, eds. Thomas Ponniah and Jonathan Eastwood (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2011), 12.
10
Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 9, 11-12; Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez
Phenomenon,” 64-65.
11
Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 11-13; Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez
Phenomenon,” 65.
12
Sylvia and Danopoulos, “The Chávez Phenomenon,” 65.
13
Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 14.
14
Ibid., 14-16.
15
Ibid., 3, 16.
9
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the chief obstacles to the pueblo’s best interests.16 Given Chávez’s intentions to lead a systematic
transformation of the political and economic order in Venezuela, he framed his “interventionist
and redistributive” agenda as the needed means by which the Venezuelan people could overcome
the “treacherous oligarchy.”17 As Chávez’s administration continued, however, Chávez altered
his rhetoric and began labeling his political opponents the “bourgeoisie,” using terms from
Marxist theory and openly calling his government “socialist” beginning in 2005.18 Chávez
pursued the goal of “participatory democracy” with the aim of politically empowering
Venezuela’s rural and urban poor, and he sought an economic transition from capitalism to what
he called twenty-first century socialism.19
Chávez presumed politicians who opposed his political agenda would threaten his socalled Bolivarian Revolution, considering dissent harmful to Venezuela’s political, economic,
and social transformation as he envisioned it.20 Thus, during his administration, the Venezuelan
government banned opposition candidates from challenging Chávez’s party in elections,
charging them with corruption but often without substantiating these accusations directly.21 For
example, the government accused Chávez’s opponent Manuel Rosales of corruption in the 2006
elections and imprisoned the judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni, who had ordered the release of a
banker whom the government had charged with corruption.22 Moreover, in 2010 the Chávez
government arrested the opposition leaders Guillermo Zuloaga and Oswaldo Álvarez Paz,

16

Ibid., 3.
Ibid.
18
Ibid., 3-4.
19
Ibid., The Revolution in Venezuela, 11, 16; Juan S. Gonzalez, “The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende’s
Glasses,” PRISM 8, no.1 (2019): 41-42, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstororg.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26597309.
20
Leonardo Vivas, “Latin America: A Backlash in Human Rights?” Harvard International Review 36, no. 2 (Fall
2014/Winter 2015): 21, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/43649263.
21
Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, 10.
22
Ibid., 10.
17
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claiming they had committed “speech crimes.”23 Still, at that point the political opposition to
Chávez did not face systematic government efforts to repress its engagement in politics, and
Chávez supporters alleged the opposition leaders listed above had broken the law and bore the
guilt of corruption.24 Nevertheless, the Chávez administration’s increasing attempts to arrest and
convict its opponents of alleged crimes led Chávez critic Theodoro Petkoff to label the
administration a “quasi-dictatorship” as early as 2010.25
Accusations that the Venezuelan government’s defense of liberal democratic values and
individual rights had markedly eroded would proliferate under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás
Maduro. During student protests directed against his government in 2014, Maduro deployed the
police and the military against the protesters.26 The Venezuelan human-rights organizations
Provea and Foro Penal reported 43 individuals had died; 854 were wounded; 154 had been
tortured; and 3,293 had faced detentions in connection to the protests as of August 2014.27 The
Maduro regime’s use of mass arrests and violence to suppress protests motivated Leonardo
Vivas, the former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy’s Latin American
Program, to assert that no contemporary Latin American ruler’s abuses of human rights could
compare to those of Chávez and Maduro.28 Also, Maduro has continued and expanded Chávez’s
policy of arresting and jailing political dissidents such as Juan Requesens, who has suffered
torture and a lack of sufficient medical condition during his imprisonment.29 According to Foro
Penal, 232 political prisoners were held captive in Venezuela as of November 2018, a number

23

Ibid..
Ibid., 10-11.
25
Ibid., 10; “Comptes rendus et essais historiographiques: 2010,” Nuevo Mundo: Mundos Nuevos,
accessed February 22, 2020, https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/60356.
26
Vivas, “Latin America: A Backlash in Human Rights?”, 21.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid., 17, 21.
29
Luis Almagro, “Defending Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere,” PRISM 8, no. 1 (2019): 6,
accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26597306.
24
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that grew to 966 just two months later.30 Venezuela’s principal intelligence agency even
assassinated the dissident Fernando Albán in October 2018.31
Both Chávez and Maduro sought to restrict the political influence of the Venezuelan
opposition by limiting freedom of the press.32 Under Chávez, the Venezuelan government
pursued policies that hampered the ability of the opposition press to promote its message freely.
The Chávez administration shut down television stations of which it did not approve, used
intimidation against regional media outlets, prosecuted journalists for alleged offenses, and
consolidated its cooperation with “friendly media” to promote the government’s policies.33
Likewise, Maduro’s administration rescinded the political opposition’s freedoms of assembly
and press, arresting the opposition figure Leopoldo López even though he was participating in a
peaceful protest.34 In 2015, López was sentenced to fourteen years in prison for allegedly using
subliminal messages to promote violence.35
In addition to the political unrest in Venezuela and the crackdowns on Venezuelans’
political freedoms, the country faces acute shortages of food and medical supplies amid its
economic turmoil.36 These shortages have emerged as aftereffects of the government’s policies
going back to the Chávez years.37 Between 2003 and 2008, Venezuela experienced a period of
rapid economic growth, in large part because of the high price of oil during those years.38 In the
wake of the 2008 global recession, however, the Venezuelan economy began to face mounting
problems that have continued ever since and that stem principally from the corruption and

30

Ibid., 5-6.
Ibid., 6.
32
Gonzalez, “The Venezuelan Crisis and Salvador Allende’s Glasses,” 42-43.
33
Ibid., 42.
34
Ibid., 43.
35
Ibid.
36
“Venezuela,” Human Rights Watch, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/americas/venezuela.
37
“Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC.
38
Eastwood, “Introduction: The Revolution in Venezuela?”, The Revolution in Venezuela, 6.
31
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policies of the Chávez and Maduro administrations.39 For example, the Chávez administration
implemented price controls to increase the affordability of goods like toiletries, flour, and
cooking oil for the Venezuelan poor.40 Faced with these price controls, Venezuelan businesses
cut back on their production of the items mentioned above, since their potential profits were
limited and they intended to ensure they were not producing more than would be profitable given
the caps on prices.41 Not only did this cutback in production contribute to Venezuelans’
shortages of key necessities, but also hyperinflation has made it difficult for Venezuelan
consumers to procure basic goods.42 By the final months of 2018, hyperinflation had grown so
severe in Venezuela that prices were doubling every nineteen days, approximately.43
In this atmosphere of economic and political tension, Maduro’s administration sought to
counteract the political influence of the National Assembly, the national legislature controlled by
the political opposition at the time.44 Thus, the administration created the National Constituent
Assembly in 2017, which included members that supported Maduro’s government, and tasked it
with devising constitutional changes for Venezuela that Maduro aimed to approve through a
national referendum.45 By the 2018 presidential elections, opposition legislators in the National
Assembly alleged the Maduro regime would not ensure free and fair elections.46 With most of
the opposition parties boycotting the elections, Maduro won a second term, but the National

Anatoly Kurmanaev, “Venezuela’s Collapse is the Worst Outside of War in Decades, Economists Say,” New York
Times, last modified May 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/world/americas/venezuela-economy.html.
40
“Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
45
“What Did Venezuelans Vote for and Why Was It So Divisive?” BBC, last modified July 31, 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40704184; Diego A. Zambrano, “The Constitutional Path to
Dictatorship in Venezuela,” Stanford Law School, last modified March 20, 2019,
https://law.stanford.edu/2019/03/20/the-constitutional-path-to-dictatorship-in-venezuela/.
46
“Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC.
39
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Assembly contended the result was invalid and claimed the presidency stood vacant.47 Thus, the
president of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, proclaimed himself acting president of
Venezuela on January 23, 2019.48 Since that date, Guaidó has gained the recognition of more
than 50 countries, but he has failed to obtain the support of countries such as Russia and China,
which continue to assert Maduro’s legitimacy.49 Amid the escalating political turmoil, Maduro
closed Venezuela’s borders with neighboring Colombia and Brazil, aiming to prevent
international aid from reaching Venezuela.50 Over the following months, this policy has resulted
in deaths and injuries of Venezuelan citizens at the country’s borders, and hundreds of soldiers in
Venezuela’s military have abandoned the Maduro regime in favor of the opposition government
based in Colombia.51 Despite Guaidó’s efforts to win the Venezuelan military to his side,
however, the bulk of the Venezuelan military has remained loyal to Maduro, preventing Guaidó
from exercising much actual political authority.52 In May 2019, Maduro’s government and the
opposition sent representatives to Norway, with the intent of negotiating a solution to the
political crisis. However, the talks failed to produce any resolution over the ensuing few
months.53 By early August, the United States had inflicted a new round of sanctions on
Venezuela, freezing Venezuelan government officials’ financial assets in the United States and
banning economic dealings between Americans and the Maduro government.54 In the wake of
these sanctions, Maduro called for his representatives to withdraw from the negotiations with the

47

Ibid.
Ibid.
49
Ibid.
50
Mason Shuya, “Russian Influence in Latin America: A Response to NATO,” Journal of Strategic Security 12, no.
2 (2019): 25, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26696258.
51
Ibid.
52
“Venezuela crisis: How the Political Situation Escalated,” BBC.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
48
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opposition, pledging not to resume negotiations given the opposition’s support for U.S.
sanctions.55
Conflicting notions of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect underlie this ongoing
international controversy over whether the Maduro regime holds political legitimacy in
Venezuela. A central principle of international relations, internal sovereignty marks the state as
the highest legal authority over the inhabitants and resources within the territory it governs.56
External sovereignty affords a state the authority to engage in international relations as the
supreme legal representative of the population it governs, on an equal legal standing with other
states according to international law.57 With the establishment of the United Nations (UN) in
1945, the dominant international legal perspective on state sovereignty emphasized the role of de
facto control over territory as a crucial condition for wielding sovereign authority.58 This
conception of sovereignty treated humanitarian interventions within the territory of a state as
exceptions to the legal norm, which interpreted a state’s authority within its territory as final and
inviolate.59 According to this interpretation of state sovereignty, limited international
interventions within a state’s territory were not construed as a challenge to states’ position as the
supreme legal authorities within their territory.60 The United Nations Charter illustrates this
outlook that international interventions should not threaten the jurisdiction accorded to sovereign
states, noting that the UN did not have authority to “intervene in matters which are essentially

55

Ibid.
Ramesh Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws, and the Use of Force in International Politics (New
York: Routledge, 2011), 78.
57
Ibid.
58
Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011), 16.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
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under the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”61 While the charter calls upon member states to
take action to preserve “international peace and security” and resolve breaches of the peace, it
does not explicitly note an intervention should attempt to alter a state’s internal policies.62
The notion of the responsibility to protect (R2P) proposes state sovereignty does not just
grant a state legal prerogatives, but also obligations to the inhabitants of the territory it
administers.63 According to this perspective on sovereignty, when a state is unable or unwilling
to defend its people and their human rights, the “broader community of states” must assume the
responsibility to protect these rights in place of the state in question.64 This subjugation of a
state’s sovereign privileges to the human rights of its citizens and their freedom from oppression,
can serve as a far-reaching justification for international intervention in states’ internal affairs,
according to Ramesh Thakur, former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.65 The
responsibility to protect, as envisioned by Thakur and the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), calls upon states to use diplomatic, economic, or
military means to prevent atrocities.66 Thus, the R2P doctrine can serve as a justification for
military interventions intended ostensibly to stop severe human rights abuses in a particular
state.67 This notion contrasts strikingly with the UN Charter’s principle of non-intervention in a
state’s internal affairs.68

“UN Charter (full text),” United Nations, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/un-charter-full-text/, I.2.7.
62
Ibid., VII.42.
63
Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect, 78-79.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid., 79.
66
Ibid., 138-139; Jonathan Graubart, “War is Not the Answer: The Responsibility to Protect and Military
Intervention,” in Theorising the Responsibility to Protect, edited by Ramesh Thakur and William Maley
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 202-203.
67
Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect, 138-139; Graubart, “War is Not the Answer,” 202-203.
68
“UN Charter (full text),” United Nations, I.2.7.
61
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By providing potential justifications for military action, R2P draws upon the influence of
just war theory developed by scholars such as the patristic writer Augustine of Hippo and the
sixteenth-century Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco de Vitoria.69 While just war
theory concerns the study of which ethical conditions need to be met for a war to be initiated and
waged justly, the concepts of just war theory and the related R2P doctrine also extend themselves
to analyses of conflicting international views about non-military intervention in Venezuelan’s
domestic politics.70 According to concepts from just war theory, an intervening party in an armed
conflict can justify military action if it intends for the war to counteract abuses of human rights
or dignity, pursues the war as a last resort, instigates the war as a proportional response to
wrongs suffered, and faces “reasonable prospects” of actually achieving its alleged goals.71 Thus,
just war theory promotes certain responsibilities of states that would engage in armed conflict
and intervene in one another’s affairs, responsibilities that lie at the center of much contemporary
debate about international support for Guaidó and Maduro.
II: Las Casas, Sovereignty, and Just War
The writings of the sixteenth-century Dominican friar and social reformer Bartolomé de
las Casas provide historical parallels to the twenty-first-century arguments about sovereignty and
the responsibility to protect that relate to the Venezuelan crisis.72 A Spanish colonist in the
Caribbean during the early sixteenth century, Las Casas turned against his fellow Spaniards’
treatment of Native Americans and dedicated decades of his life to writing and lobbying on

Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” 182, 186-187; Francisco de Vitoria, “XVI.
De Indis,” in La conquista del Nuevo Mundo: Textos y documentos de la aventura americana, ed. Mercedes Serna
(Barcelona: Clásicos Castalia, 2012), 413.
70
Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Just War Tradition,” 182, 186-187.
71
Ibid., 182-183.
72
Diego von Vacano, “Las Casas and the Birth of Race,” History of Political Thought 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2012):
406-407, accessed February 22, 2020, https://www-jstor-org.echo.louisville.edu/stable/26225794.
69
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behalf of reforms in Spanish policy toward the natives.73 Las Casas sought to influence the Holy
Roman Emperor Charles V (Charles I of Spain) and his successor, King Philip II of Spain, to
revise Spanish policy in the New World so as to integrate Native Americans into the general fold
of Spanish subjects.74 In the 1540s, Las Casas set about writing his work Brevísima relación de
la destrucción de las Indias (An Account, Much Abbreviated, of the Destruction of the Indies), in
which he laid out his grievances against the Spanish treatment of Native Americans in a manner
that drew from the political thought of both Christian and classical writers.75
In particular, Las Casas decried the “unjust . . . warfare” the Spanish colonists and
conquistadores had waged against the natives, as well as the “bondage” to which the Spaniards
had sought to subject the natives who survived the initial onslaught of warfare and European
diseases.76 Moreover, he condemned the Spaniards’ motives in carrying out these courses of
action, accusing them of aiming to wrest natives’ riches from their original possessors and of
advancing their social position for the sake of “insatiable greed and ambition.”77 Through these
critiques of his fellow Spaniards, Las Casas demonstrated his viewpoint that when individuals
from one society intervene in another society’s political, religious, or economic affairs, they
should only do so with just motives and in ways that are consistent with natural law. The notion
of natural law, derived over the centuries by classical philosophers such as Aristotle and
Christian writers such as Thomas Aquinas, alleges there are universal norms of just human
behavior that enable people to pursue a moral, fulfilling, and ideal life.78 Not only did Las Casas
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accuse the Spanish treatment of Native Americans of having violated natural law, but he also
wrote it violated divine law – that is, law that he believed God had handed down to govern
human behavior.79 By alleging the Spaniards had broken laws with universal authority, Las
Casas implied any international intervention that violated these norms would lose its legitimacy.
In doing so, he presaged the eventual articulation of a more secular notion of universal human
rights and states’ responsibilities that would serve to justify the responsibility to protect doctrine
in the twenty-first century.80
Las Casas contended unjust Spanish treatment of Native Americans, not colonialism in
and of itself, rendered the Spanish conquests in the Americas unjustified.81 Demonstrating his
belief that nonviolent intervention of the Spanish in the natives’ societies was not inherently
wrong, Las Casas described the lands in the Americas as having been “given in trust by God and
His Church” to the authority of the Castilian monarchy.82 In keeping with the dominant
perspective of the clergymen of the Dominican Order, Las Casas supported Spanish settlement in
the Americas and the conversion of native peoples to Catholicism.83 In doing so, he revealed his
implicit belief that the Spanish monarchy’s assumption of political authority over conquered
natives in place of the native potentates who had held power before the conquests did not violate
natural or international law per se. Rather, Las Casas considered the papal delegation of
authoritative privileges over much of the Americas to the Castilian crown as the justification for
the exercise of Spanish authority over indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere.84 Las
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Casas did argue Spanish oppressors of Native Americans had violated “natural, divine, and
human law” in his Brevísima relación.85 However, his reasoning focused on Spaniards’ abuse of
their supposedly sovereign authority over native peoples, rather than an indictment of their
assumption of that authority, for Las Casas considered Spanish sovereignty in the Americas to
have been handed down from a higher authority – the Papacy.86
By contrasting his notion of Spanish sovereignty and duties toward indigenous peoples
with Spaniards’ actual behavior toward Native Americans, Las Casas implied Spanish colonizers
had neglected their responsibilities toward the natives under Spanish rule.87 Thus, he espoused
the viewpoint that sovereignty comes with obligations to protect the governed, much like the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of the twenty-first
century, which asserts states do not have the right to infringe upon universal human rights of
their citizens.88 In a similar way, Las Casas reasoned the demands of natural law should take
precedence over Spaniards’ authority to do as they pleased toward the natives.89 In this way, he
applied a principle similar to one that the sixteenth-century Spanish philosopher Francisco de
Vitoria had employed to defend Spaniards’ rights of subjugating the natives to their rule. In his
work De Indis, which concerns various ethical questions associated with the Spanish conquest of
the Americas, Vitoria asserted the primacy of natural and divine law over sovereigns’ laws.90 He
claimed a human law that attempts to prohibit an action that natural and divine law permit is no
true law at all, supporting his argument by invoking hypothetical laws of Native American
societies that he contended would violate natural law.91 Despite the differences in Vitoria and
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Las Casas’s principal arguments, Vitoria’s elevation of universal, legal binding principles over
political authorities’ freedom of action afforded itself to Las Casas’s critique of Spanish actions
toward the natives for having violated natural law.
Invoking the superiority of natural laws over sovereigns’ laws, Las Casas defended the
sovereignty of Native American rulers as protected by natural law, believing the Spanish did not
have the right to overthrow native rulers unilaterally if indigenous rulers had not opposed the
spread of Christianity maliciously.92 In his work Thirty Very Juridical Propositions, Las Casas
argued natives who practiced idol worship could not be punished by any human judge, implying
external, secular authorities should not impinge upon Native Americans’ political and social
autonomy.93 This proposition put Las Casas at odds with his contemporary, the Spanish
philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, for the latter considered natives’ idolatry a central
justification for Spanish military action against them.94 However, Las Casas’s writing on this
subject reflected a perspective akin to that of Pope Innocent IV.95 During the thirteenth century,
Innocent IV declared Christian rulers did not have the right to usurp the sovereignty of nonChristian rulers, subjecting the policies of Christian sovereigns to a higher legal principle.96 Even
though Las Casas regarded the Pope as exercising spiritual authority over all individuals,
whether they be Christians or not, his position on this subject did not detract from his belief that
Christians should not violate natives’ political sovereignty on their own initiative.97 Though Las
Casas claimed the Spanish government had obtained a right to rule over the Americas through
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the concession of the Pope, he did not provide a justification for Spanish violence against natives
in the name of such sovereign authority.98 Also, according to Las Casas, an allegedly just war of
Spaniards against the natives would not be truly just unless the natives meant genuine malice to
the Spanish or to Christianity.99
Las Casas’s views about the Spanish conquests in the Americas set him apart from
Sepúlveda, whom he debated at Valladolid in 1550 and 1551 at the request of Emperor Charles
V.100 Sepúlveda contended the Spanish conquests in the Americas were justified and argued the
use of violence against Native Americans could serve a useful purpose in the expansion of
Christianity and the suppression of particular native cultures’ practices, such as human
sacrifice.101 Also, Sepúlveda believed the Native Americans were naturally suited for
subservience to the Spanish, employing arguments from the political writings of Aristotle to
support his assertion that certain people were innately fit for servitude.102 Labeling the natives
inherent servants to the allegedly superior Spaniards, Sepúlveda wrote in favor of war against the
natives because he maintained it would bring them under the tutelage of a supposedly superior
political authority.103 In his arguments, Sepúlveda emphasized the averred ends of an
international intervention over the means used to achieve it, and he considered a war just if it
produced the ends he considered desirable. According to Sepúlveda, the importance of bringing
an end to natives’ pre-Christian religious practices and subjugating them to Spanish rule
rendered the harm the Spaniards inflicted on Native Americans a totally acceptable effect of the
conquest.104
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Although Las Casas’s arguments about Spanish colonization did not reject the concept of
just war, they rebutted Sepúlveda’s attempts to justify the Spanish treatment of indigenous
peoples in the Americas.105 Las Casas’s arguments affirmed Native Americans and Spaniards
held equal status before God and shared the same natural rights to receive just treatment from
others.106 Thus, Las Casas distinguished himself sharply from Sepúlveda, who considered the
natives naturally inferior to Christian Spaniards and asserted natives’ subjection to Spanish rule,
believing such an arrangement was allegedly ideal and consistent with divine law.107 Las Casas
regarded Spanish intervention in Native American societies as legitimate only if it were
predicated on papal authorization and stemmed from motives of spreading Christianity and
bringing Native Americans under the fold of the Spanish Crown in a peaceful, “civilizing”
manner.108 In Las Casas’s view, if the Spanish strayed from these pursuits, they would forfeit the
justification for their colonization efforts in the Americas.109 Thus, he revealed his alignment
with the concept from just war theory that demands the use of force against a state be predicated
on just intentions and executed through just actions.110
In Las Casas’s view, ambitions of self-aggrandizement at others’ expense and actions
resulting in cruelty could not justify intervention in Native American societies.111 With this
perspective, Las Casas made clear that he considered morally condonable means to be just as
important as morally acceptable goals when executing an international intervention. Las Casas’s
support for the evangelization of Native Americans despite the Spaniards’ cruel policies toward
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them attests to his belief that not all components of an international intervention are rendered
illegitimate because cruelty and violence are present in the intervention.112 However, if an
intervention in another society gave rise to “wrongs, failings, defects, or evils,” Las Casas argued
such effects had to be countered with the authority of the Castilian monarch, acting in his
responsibility to punish his subject’s wrongdoings.113 In this manner, Las Casas asserted his
understanding that sovereign rulers possess authority over those whom they rule, but also have a
duty to uphold what is right and to punish offenses against natural law.114 Las Casas’s
articulation of the Spanish monarch’s responsibility to uphold justice in his realm and of
Spaniards’ responsibility to adhere to natural law would find parallels in the evolution of
viewpoints about sovereignty in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
III: The Theoretical Evolution and Application of Sovereignty and Just War Theory
Las Casas began his work Thirty Very Juridical Propositions by labeling Spaniards’
unjust treatment of Native Americans as contrary to natural principles of justice, considering
policies toward indigenous peoples void of legitimacy if they conflicted with natural law.115 He
supplemented this claim by appealing to the Castilian king, writing the monarch had a duty to
extirpate the wrongs the Spaniards had inflicted on the native peoples of the Americas and
insisting these wrongs had violated natural law.116 This principle, which promoted a sovereign’s
duty to uphold a universally-applicable law in the wake of injustices, would come to underlie the
twenty-first century notion of the responsibility to protect.117 To grasp how Las Casas’s political
thought relates to the international legal arguments surrounding the present-day Venezuelan
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crisis, is important to understand how Las Casas understood the notion of sovereign
responsibility. Moreover, it is crucial to distinguish how Las Casas’s conceptions of sovereignty
and the responsibilities of sovereigns differ from the twenty-first century perceptions of
sovereigns’ responsibilities.
Las Casas was not alone in his articulation of a sovereign ruler’s duty to promote justice
in the sixteenth century, for Vitoria also wrote about duties to natural law and their application in
international relations.118 In his work De Indis, Vitoria applied his notion of the supremacy of
natural laws to argue Spanish intervention in Native American societies would not only be
permissible, but also necessary, if pursued with the aim of halting and avenging wrongs against
natural law that the Spaniards or the natives had suffered.119 In particular, he asserted the Spanish
had both the right and the duty to protect innocents threatened with offenses against natural law,
such as human sacrifice and cannibalism.120 Vitoria supported his arguments in De Indis with
quotations from the biblical book of Proverbs; the writings of spiritual authorities from Christian
history, such as Pope Innocent III; and the biblical command to care for one’s neighbors.121
Despite the religious basis on which Vitoria developed his arguments, his conclusions serve as
predecessors of twenty-first-century theory about the limits of state sovereignty and the
responsibility to protect. Vitoria’s declaration that the Pope could depose Native American rulers
if those rulers oppressed native converts to Christianity serves as an excellent case in point.122
His reasoning, drawing upon the principle that natural and divine laws trump those of
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governments, argues that sovereign states have a binding responsibility to defend their citizens’
universal human rights.123
Las Casas applied this perspective on sovereigns’ responsibilities to his writings on the
role of the Castilian monarchy in the government of territories in the Americas. In Thirty Very
Juridical Propositions, he wrote the Castilian monarch had an obligation from divine right to
promote just laws and customs in the Americas.124 Las Casas did not claim that a higher political
authority should assume sovereignty in place of the Castilian king if the monarch did not
exercise his duties to uphold justice in his realm. Nevertheless, his elaboration of the
responsibilities of the Castilian sovereign and not just those of his Spanish subjects toward
Native Americans attests to Las Casas’s view that a government’s authority is limited, just as the
R2P doctrine asserts state sovereignty is limited. Las Casas’s expressed this perception of
sovereignty further through his assertion of the Pope’s supreme spiritual authority over
Christians and non-Christians, for he implied the Pope could rightfully exercise his authority to
punish a Christian monarch who failed to uphold just laws.125
Las Casas’s notions of sovereigns’ responsibilities would find parallels in the twentieth
century as a more modern articulation of sovereign responsibility began to emerge in the postWorld War II international order. Just as Las Casas considered the Pope to hold an overarching
authority to promote moral order within Christian kingdoms and hold Christian sovereigns
accountable for injustices, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld asserted the UN’s
administrative apparatus had the authority to maintain peace and security in the international
community.126 Hammarskjöld considered the UN uniquely positioned to protect newly
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decolonized states from assaults on their sovereignty and to prevent the outbreak of postcolonial
violence during the 1950s and 1960s, seeing as the UN had a duty to act independently of any
state.127 Hammarskjöld’s impact on the development of the UN’s role as a “policing and
managerial” actor advanced the notion that the UN, as well as other international actors, could
intervene in a state to promote humanitarian goals without becoming a partial participant in the
state’s domestic conflicts.128 The notion that Hammarskjöld championed did not advance the
idea that a state had such a right to intervene in another state’s internal affairs. This conception of
the UN’s promotion of international security and conflict resolution served to justify expansions
of UN peacekeeping operations in the last decades of the twentieth century.129 However, UN
forces’ failures to prevent the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the massacre of civilians at
Srebrenica during the Balkan wars of the 1990s prompted increasing international criticism of
the UN’s role in addressing international crises and humanitarian disasters.130 Much of this
criticism, which came specially from Western media and activists, questioned the UN’s efforts to
stay neutral in crises and critiqued the notion that UN peacekeepers should only use force
defensively amid periods of intense violence against civilians.131
Despite increasing international dissatisfaction with the UN’s flawed peacekeeping
operations during the 1990s, the widespread international acceptance of UN peacekeeping in
principle maintained the consensus that the UN, not just sovereign states, had the authority to
intervene in states’ internal conflicts to promote peace and security.132 The implication of this
viewpoint did not assert that the UN held authority to assume the political powers of a sovereign
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state without that state’s permission during peacekeeping operations. It did, however, confirm
other international actors besides states could legitimately involve themselves militarily and
politically in the attempted resolution of a state’s internal crises.133 Thus, UN peacekeeping
operations expressed the conviction that crises threatening individuals’ human rights were global
issues of importance to all states, not just domestic issues of any one state.134 By supporting a
UN prerogative to prosecute humanitarian attempts to restore stability to states wracked with
conflict, Hammarskjöld indicated that the UN had a responsibility to act on behalf of
humanitarian goals with universal importance.135 Francis Deng, the UN Secretary-General’s
Representative on Internally Displaced Persons during the 1990s, articulated the notion of
international responsibility to resolve armed conflicts further.136 He formulated the concept of
“‘sovereignty as responsibility’” that argued states – not just the UN – had a responsibility to
limit their use of power to protect civilians.137 The 2002 formation of the African Union (AU)
from the Organization of African Unity further developed this concept that sovereignty entails
limits on a state’s prerogatives, which must adhere to overarching standards against humanrights abuses.138 The AU’s Constitutive Act afforded it the authority to intervene in a member
state’s affairs if the assembly of member states agreed intervention would be necessary to stop
“‘war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’”139
The concept of the responsibility to protect drew from earlier ideas of limits on
sovereignty and international duty to protect human rights, but this so-called doctrine of
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contested international norms did not assume its current form and name until the turn of the
twenty-first century.140 In 2000, the Canadian government promoted the establishment of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).141 This commission’s
initial duty concerned an investigation of whether or not the 1999 military intervention of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the conflict in Kosovo had been in accordance
with international law.142 The ICISS contributed critically to the debate about international
intervention in armed conflicts by shifting the focus from an international “‘right to intervene’”
to every state’s “‘responsibility to protect’” its population from crimes against humanity.143 The
commission worded these concepts in this way to undercut the notion that states could
legitimately intervene in another state’s affairs for ostensibly humanitarian reasons while in fact
seeking to impose their political will on another state.144 Thus, the ICISS related the emerging
R2P doctrine to just war theory’s call for military interventions to be predicated on the
intervening party’s right intentions for taking up arms.145 However, the extreme difficulty of
ascertaining whether a state’s intervention is based on right intentions lends itself to the
skepticism that governments, including the Venezuelan government, have shown toward R2P.146
The 2005 UN General Assembly resolution on R2P established the responsibility to
protect as a formal principle in international affairs, although the principle has yet to gain
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universal acceptance from the international community.147 In a decision whose principle pertains
particularly to the Venezuelan crisis, the General Assembly endorsed international efforts to use
a variety of preventive measures to forestall an outbreak of abuses of human rights that might
call for an international military response.148 This position relies upon the idea that the
international community would be justified in using peaceful means to pressure a government
into changing its policies in order to avert a humanitarian crisis.149 The non-military component
of the R2P doctrine’s characterization of international interventions provides theoretical support
for the diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó on the part of governments who oppose the Maduro
regime and consider Maduro’s policies threatening to Venezuelans’ human rights.150 Also, the
R2P’s emphasis on non-military options for international intervention parallels Las Casas’s
support for non-military Spanish intervention in Native American societies to spread
Catholicism.151 Nevertheless, non-military interventions in a crisis often do not serve as realistic
means to counteract human rights abuses, just as U.S. sanctions against the Maduro regime and
countries’ diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó have not prompted an end to the Maduro
government’s human rights abuses. Thus, the R2P doctrine’s justifications for military
intervention remain crucial to distinguishing R2P from earlier notions of the proper
circumstances for intervention as described in the UN Charter.152 The diplomatic recognitions
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that governments have extended to Guaidó do not necessarily constitute support for the R2P
doctrine, for diplomatic recognition serves as a legitimate means to confer acceptance of a
government’s sovereignty, without respect to R2P.153
The R2P’s relation to the concept of right intention aligns it with Las Casas’s
condemnations of Spaniards’ intentions in their treatment of Native Americas during the early
sixteenth century. Despite Las Casas’s ardent support for the Christianization of the natives, he
did not justify his fellow Spaniards’ behavior toward the natives simply on the basis that they
claimed to be spreading Christianity.154 Rather, Las Casas alleged the Spaniards’ failures to
adhere to natural law in their treatment of the natives delegitimized the means by which they had
propagated their conquests in the Americas, condemning Spaniards’ use of Native Americans as
forced laborers in particular.155
Also, Las Casas’s writings exemplified the perspective that sovereignty comes with
responsibility, the axiom that underlies the principle of the responsibility to protect.156 He
implored the Emperor Charles V to avenge the wrongs the Spaniards had inflicted on the Native
Americas, writing, “It is the duty of the king, with greatest study and vigilant industry, to root . . .
out” such injustices.157 Las Casas did not claim a foreign power could legitimately seek to
undermine the Spanish king’s authority or overthrow him militarily if he did not live up to the
“duty” Las Casas described. However, Las Casas insisted the king had an obligation to not
tolerate the depopulation of indigenous peoples in the Americas and the Spaniards’ cruelty
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toward them.158 In his Brevísima relación, Las Casas implied such offenses against natural law
were so severe that a higher authority had to punish them if the Spanish colonists in the
Americas would not do so.159 Las Casas’s articulation of a sovereign’s responsibility to uphold
justice with that sovereign’s territory provides a historical precedent for its application in the
R2P doctrine. Additionally, Las Casas’s assertion of papal spiritual authority over all people
serves as a precedent for the responsibility to protect doctrine’s underlying assumption that an
international authority higher than any one state, such as the UN or a coalition of states, can
wield legitimate authority to defend international peace and security.160 Therefore, despite the
differences in the historical contexts and the tenets of Las Casas’s arguments and the R2P
doctrine, the latter exemplifies Las Casas’s attitudes about the inviolate responsibilities of
sovereigns. The principle of the responsibility to protect also serves as an evolved expression of
Las Casas’s support for nonviolent interventions that promoted ends he viewed as just.161
At the same time, however, Las Casas’s opposition to international interventions that did
not enjoy the backing of the papacy and that inflicted harm on individuals sets his views apart
from R2P.162 Whereas R2P provides a justification for states to act in coalitions or even
unilaterally to use nonviolent or military means to intervene in a state and address violations of
human rights, Las Casas did not provide for such a possibility of unilateral political or military
intervention in his arguments.163 Rather, Sepúlveda’s arguments in favor of Spanish military
intervention against Native Americans, which he portrayed as an important means to counteract
polytheistic religious practices in the Americas, serves as a closer precedent for the R2P
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doctrine.164 Unlike Las Casas, Sepúlveda did not qualify his arguments in favor of military
intervention on a need for approval from a higher international authority.165
Also, Sepúlveda considered military intervention to be a necessary means to put a stop to
particular Native American practices that contradicted natural law, whereas Las Casas argued
unilateral political or military intervention in Native American societies was unjustified even
when such societies engaged in practices that violated natural law.166 Therefore, Sepúlveda’s
views parallel the R2P’s justifications for international interventions better than Las Casas’s
views do. However, Sepúlveda’s portrayal of the Native Americans in a racist way that
emphasized their alleged inferiority to the Spaniards impedes his views’ appeal to twenty-firstcentury readers. Furthermore, his broad justification of military interventions puts his views at
odds with a key principle of the UN Charter that states should not intervene without permission
in another state’s internal affairs, a principle that R2P also violates.167 Also, Sepúlveda’s writings
do not necessarily apply well to the Venezuelan crisis in particular because it is not clear how a
potential military intervention in Venezuela would be carried out and whether or not it would
stand a realistic chance of producing a lasting improvement in Venezuelans’ well-being.
Certainly, the status quo in Venezuela is unacceptable in that Venezuelan citizens have been
dying and suffering human rights violations at the hands of the Maduro regime.168 Still, a
military intervention should be pursued if that option is considered the last and best resort for
counteracting human rights abuses that would enjoy a likely chance of achieving that aim.169
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Vitoria’s writings took a middle ground between Las Casas and Sepúlveda’s arguments
regarding military intervention. While Vitoria did not establish as wide-ranging of a justification
for military intervention in his arguments as did Sepúlveda, he did consider military intervention
justified if a state violated international legal principles of “the law of nations,” such as freedom
of trade, so long as interventions aimed to promote “peace and security.”170 Crucially, Vitoria’s
arguments’ limits on the applicability of international interventions establish his views as in
alignment with the pre-R2P notions of international intervention as needing to be predicated on
gaining the permission of a state before intervening in its territory.171 Vitoria did not center his
arguments around justifications of interventions to correct abuses of natural law by a government
against its own citizens. Still, his arguments on the justification of interventions bear greater
moral and practical weight with respect to Venezuela than do those of Las Casas, for the
international community should not stand by and allow the unjust Venezuelan status quo to
persist. Vitoria’s acceptance of certain international interventions that are intended to alleviate
sufferings endured, while not describing the same context as that of the Venezuelan crisis, lends
itself to potential political or military interventions that could be applied in Venezuela. Las Casas
rejected international interventions that were launched without papal authority and that inflicted
harm on Native Americans.172 Thus, his restrictive views on international interventions’
justifiability are less applicable than those of Vitoria to governments’ and international
organizations’ efforts to pressure the Maduro regime to refrain from further human rights abuses.
However, Las Casas’s interest in preventing international interventions from resulting in
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injustices and oppression toward individuals does lend itself to analysis of the Venezuelan crisis,
for any international intervention in Venezuela, whether it be political, economic, or even
military, should seek to minimize harm to Venezuelan citizens.173 This principle of
proportionality, which calls for international interventions to use necessary means to counteract
injustices without inflicting more harm than they aim to resolve, underlies the political thought
of Las Casas, and it also serves as a key principle in Vitoria’s political thought.174 Thus, the
arguments regarding the Venezuelan crisis that align with Vitoria’s views about the justifiability
of certain international interventions to address injustices and that align with Las Casas’s views
about proportionality provide morally and practically favorable courses of action for the
international community with respect to the Venezuelan crisis.
IV: The Venezuelan Crisis and Conflicting Views of Sovereignty and its Limits
Juan Guaidó’s 2019 bid for international recognition as Venezuelan president and the
varying international responses to his claim to such authority has illuminated conflicting notions
of sovereignty in the Venezuelan crisis, reflecting positive and skeptical views of the
responsibility to protect. On the one hand, governments that have recognized Guaidó have based
their decisions to do so on the notion that the Maduro regime has forfeited its claim to
sovereignty because of its failures to uphold “free and fair elections” and protect human rights.175
States that have recognized Guaidó include the United States as well as several European and
Latin American countries, leaving Cuba and Bolivia as the only Latin American states openly
backing Maduro.176 When the United States Department of State recognized Guaidó as
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Venezuela’s interim president in late January 2019, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo framed
this recognition as congruent with Venezuela’s constitution and the will of the country’s
National Assembly.177 He referred to the National Assembly as “legitimately elected” in contrast
to Maduro, and he demanded Maduro “step aside in favor of a legitimate leader” who would
hold the genuine support of the Venezuelan electorate.178 Branding Maduro’s administration a
“disastrous dictatorship,” Pompeo depicted the U.S. recognition of Guaidó as consistent with
Venezuelans’ struggle for the rule of law and political freedoms, as well as the pursuit of “free
and fair elections.”179 Pompeo’s arguments reflect his portrayal of the U.S. recognition of Guaidó
– a diplomatic intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis – as a defense of Venezuelan
sovereignty, not a violation of it. After all, long-standing principles of international relations
have viewed diplomatic recognition as a wholly legitimate act that serves as one of the primary
tests of a government’s sovereignty.180 By declaring Venezuelan sovereignty to rest in the hands
of Guaidó, the National Assembly, and the people who elected Venezuela’s legislators, Pompeo
represented the U.S. recognition of Guaidó as a completely justified act.181 Moreover, his
references to the pursuit of democracy, political liberties, and free elections in Venezuela
demonstrated the U.S. argument that Venezuela’s government has a responsibility to protect
democracy and the rights of its citizens.182
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Thus, the U.S. recognition of Guaidó reveals the U.S. government considers its support
for Guaidó to align with international law and universal principles, noting Maduro’s failure to
uphold his government’s responsibilities toward the people of Venezuela.183 This rationale
corresponds to the 2005 World Summit Outcome on R2P’s interpretation of state sovereignty,
which claims governments must uphold absolute responsibilities to protect their citizens’ rights
and contends governments revoke their sovereignty when they fail to fulfill such duties.184
According to this understanding of sovereignty, when a government does not adhere to its
responsibilities to defend the human rights of its people, other states have the right to use
diplomatic and economic means to pressure that government to change its policies.185 While
Pompeo did not reference the term responsibility to protect explicitly when defending the U.S.
recognition of Guaidó, his arguments for that recognition are replete with the approach to
sovereignty and international intervention embodied in the R2P doctrine.186 Pompeo’s statement
assumes a priori that sovereignty demands responsibility and does not just convey privileges to a
government.187 Moreover, his insistence that “free and fair elections” occur in Venezuela implies
securing such elections is so vital to Venezuela that some authority must take action to promote
them, even if that authority is another state or a coalition of states that seek to influence
Venezuelan politics.188 According to this line of thought, the United States would have the right
to use diplomatic recognition as a political tool to promote the authority of one faction in another
state’s political crisis while attempting to undermine the authority of the other faction.
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The leaders of European countries such as France, Germany, Spain, and the United
Kingdom have recognized Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela as well, sharing
Guaidó’s view that Maduro rigged the 2018 presidential elections and subsequently refused to
hold snap elections.189 Like Pompeo, these leaders justified their decision to recognize Guaidó by
invoking limits on the Maduro regime’s sovereignty.190 For instance, Spanish Prime Minister
Pedro Sánchez coupled his recognition of Guaidó with a call for Venezuela to implement
“elections that are free, democratic, with guarantees and without exclusions.”191 The United
Kingdom’s former Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, echoed Sánchez’s sentiment when he
remarked, “The Maduro regime must end. It is time for free and fair elections.”192 Therefore,
Sánchez and Hunt have based their claims of Maduro’s illegitimacy on his regime’s failure to
preserve elections that are free and fair, implying a government forfeits its sovereignty when it
does not carry out such elections. Their remarks assert a government’s sovereignty comes with
responsibilities to preserve the rights of the inhabitants of that state to engage in politics
democratically, a viewpoint consistent with the R2P doctrine’s insistence that governments must
uphold their citizens’ human rights. At the same time, however, the European governments that
have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president have not invoked the R2P doctrine directly to
justify their decision, just as Pompeo did not mention R2P in his remarks. Instead of claiming
their states or their international community is assuming responsibilities that the Maduro regime
has forfeited, the spokesmen for the European governments that have recognized Guaidó
asserted the Venezuelan people continue to hold true sovereignty within their country.193 Thus,
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these governments portray their diplomatic intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis as a
means to restore rightful sovereignty to the Venezuelan people, rather than as a means to usurp
sovereignty from Maduro’s government.
Luis Almagro, the tenth Secretary General of the Organization of American States
(OAS), further exemplifies the viewpoint of the U.S., Canadian, and European governments that
sovereign states have a responsibility to defend democratic institutions within their
jurisdiction.194 Calling democracy “a right for the peoples of the Americas,” Almagro has argued
“all sectors of society, domestic and international,” should contribute continuously to the
protection of “democracy, freedom, and human rights.”195 His reference to collaboration between
domestic and international organizations on behalf of democracy and human rights illustrates the
perspective that those institutions and principles are outside the authority of any one state to
repress. Almagro thus demonstrated he considers it both acceptable and necessary for states to
apply pressure on governments that are violating human rights, with the aim of influencing them
to uphold their responsibilities to defend those rights. In this way, Almagro advanced the
position on sovereignty that Pompeo, Sánchez, and Hunt used to justify their countries’
recognitions of Guaidó, demonstrating alignment with the R2P doctrine.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres, while not expressing support for either Maduro
or Guaidó, urged “all relevant actors” in the Venezuelan crisis to participate in dialogue to
resolve the turmoil and respect “the rule of law and human rights.”196 In a statement his
spokesperson issued on January 24, 2019, Guterres expressed his support for a “transparent and
independent investigation” of reports that there had been casualties in the aftermath of political
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protests in Venezuela.197 These statements indicate Guterres regards casualties inflicted on
protesting civilians and the protection of human rights in Venezuela as international concerns,
not matters subject solely to the jurisdiction of the Venezuelan government. Guterres did not call
for an international intervention in Venezuelan political affairs through diplomatic, economic, or
military means. However, he did display his standpoint that external actors have the right to
investigate potential abuses of human rights and that the Maduro regime should uphold the
human rights of its citizens, as well as “prevent violence and avoid any escalation” of the
crisis.198 Thus, Guterres has implied the same belief in the limited privileges of sovereignty that
underlies the above-mentioned statements of Pompeo, Sánchez, Hunt, and Almagro. When he
called for all actors in the Venezuelan crisis to preserve human rights and promote the rule of
law, Guterres depicted sovereignty as a status that comes with the responsibility to protect
Venezuelans’ rights.199
Various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have made implicit appeals to the
concepts of the R2P doctrine to critique the Maduro regime’s policies. For instance, Human
Rights Watch (HRW) has framed the shortages of food and medicine in Venezuela under
Maduro as an “unprecedented humanitarian emergency.”200 José Miguel Vivanco, Executive
Director of HRW’s Americas Division, has called Maduro’s government and security forces
guilty of “serious violations” of human rights.201 He has singled out the Maduro regime for
“violations to the rights of food and health” as well as for politically motivated arrests, tortures,
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and executions of the regime’s political opposition.202 To address these abuses of human rights,
Vivanco has urged the Human Rights Council (HRC) to support the formation of an
“independent fact-finding mission” that would launch its own investigations into those guilty of
“egregious crimes” taking place in Venezuela.203
Vivanco’s proposal demonstrates the HRW’s leadership’s conviction that governments
must not use their sovereignty as an excuse to abuse the human rights of their citizens. Moreover,
Vivanco’s call for the creation of a fact-finding mission to investigate the Venezuelan
government’s extrajudicial arrests, tortures, and executions reveals his belief that the
international community should hold Maduro’s government accountable for its human rights
violations.204 This perspective lends itself to the argument that bringing violators of human rights
to justice is so important that an international fact-finding mission has a right to investigate a
government’s dispensation of domestic punishments. The Venezuelan government has claimed it
would allow the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
to investigate its policies in light of international pressure from other states, and Vivanco has
insisted that “this is not the time to relax that pressure.”205 Thus, Vivanco has invoked the
principle from the 2005 World Summit Outcome on R2P that outlines the international
community’s responsibility to employ “peaceful means” to protect human rights in a state whose
government violates them.206
Amnesty International shares this attitude toward the Venezuelan crisis, considering
Maduro and his security forces complicit in “crimes against international law and human rights
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violations” and calling for top Venezuelan government officials to answer for such crimes before
“an independent and impartial judicial body.”207 This recommendation serves as another
manifestation of the idea that the international community should intervene in a state that does
not comply with its obligation to protect its citizens from human rights abuses.208 Another NGO,
the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, has framed the Venezuelan crisis as one that
“leaves populations at risk of potential crimes against humanity.”209 In its assessment of the
Venezuelan crisis, this organization notes the Venezuelan government has not upheld the
political rights of all Venezuelans “regardless of political affiliation.”210 That said, the
organization does not approve of all international efforts to influence the Venezuelan
government to adhere to its responsibility to protect. For instance, the Global Centre has called
the United States’ increased implementation of economic sanctions against the Maduro regime
an unwise course of policy, predicting such sanctions will make it more difficult for Venezuelans
to procure medicine, food, and other necessary goods.211
In contrast to these NGOs, the Venezuelan government has invoked a more traditional
perspective on sovereignty that rejects the current notion of the responsibility to protect. At the
2005 session of the World Summit General Assembly, Chávez presented his government’s
grievances against R2P, urging other governments to prohibit “a handful of countries” to
reinterpret international legal principles according to the R2P doctrine.212 He even linked R2P
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with “preemptive war,” implying other countries threatened Venezuela with preemptive war
through the potential use of R2P to justify armed intervention in Venezuela.213 According to
Chávez’s perspective, R2P offers states a convenient and unjustified excuse to interfere in
sovereign states’ internal affairs, implying the negative effects of interventions predicated on
R2P would overshadow the allegedly admirable justifications for those interventions.214
Venezuela’s delegation to the UN continued to use such an argument at the 2009 UN General
Assembly, when it spoke in opposition to the conclusions of the 2005 World Summit Declaration
on R2P.215 In 2012, the Venezuelan delegation to the UN again argued against the responsibility
to protect, making Venezuela one of only two states to denounce R2P openly during the informal
dialogue.216
Li Junhua, the counselor for China’s UN mission as of June 2007, made a similar
argument before the UN Security Council, claiming intervention in a sovereign state’s internal
affairs should be pursued only if “the will of the government concerned be respected” and if “no
arbitrary intervention” be carried out “over its objection.”217 During the interactive dialogue at
the 2017 UN General Assembly, the Russian delegation also critiqued R2P.218 The delegation
questioned the efficacy of R2P as a viable tool to address abuses of human rights, claiming
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R2P’s implementation had “resulted in complete failure” in “recent country specific cases,”
apparently referring to the UN-backed 2011 outside intervention in Libya’s civil war.219 Just as
the prudential constraint from just war theory contends a war should not be waged if its
perpetrators do not enjoy a reasonable chance of success, the Russian government contends R2P
should not be implemented because it is unlikely to achieve its stated ends.220 Additionally, the
Russian speaker criticized the most recent UN report on R2P at the time for its use of “vague
terms” like “atrocity crimes” and its alleged failure to note exactly what R2P meant or how it
would be implemented.221 Chávez, too, portrayed R2P as ominously vague, noting, “We have to
ask ourselves who is going to protect us, how are they going to protect us.”222 Chávez’s concerns
with who would carry out interventions predicated on R2P relates closely to concerns that the
R2P doctrine could serve as a convenient excuse for a state’s self-aggrandizement.223 Given the
skepticism of the Venezuelan, Chinese, and Russian governments toward R2P, predictably these
countries have rejected the arguments concerning human rights in Venezuela that the
governments that recognize Guaidó have invoked.
The Venezuelan, Chinese, and Russian positions on state sovereignty in the wake of the
development of the R2P doctrine demonstrate that these governments claim to view sovereignty
as inviolate on a global scale, meaning there is no higher authority than the sovereign state in
international law. Liu Zhenmin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN as of
December 2006, asserted that state sovereignty must not be infringed, implying the absolute
protection of governments’ authority within their jurisdictions is a legal principle of international
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relations that applies to all nations.224 Liu’s statement implied that states have no lawful right to
intervene in each other’s sovereign affairs ever, in accordance with the early principle of nonintervention in the UN Charter.225 The Chinese government’s position on international
interventions bears a parallel to Las Casas’s writings, for Las Casas believed Christian
sovereigns could not lawfully wrest political authority from Native American rulers except in
cases of genuine malice against Christians or in the case of having received political authority
from the Pope.226 In other words, Las Casas did not favor a unilateral Spanish political or
military intervention in Native American societies, especially not one predicated on devious
motives inconsistent with natural law.227
V. Las Casas and Sovereignty in the Current Venezuelan Crisis
The United States has supported its recognition of Guaidó and its opposition to the
Maduro regime by asserting ultimate sovereignty in Venezuela rests with the Venezuelan people,
not with Maduro’s government.228 This notion of sovereignty is found in U.S. President Donald
Trump’s remarks about the Venezuelan crisis in Miami, Florida in February 2019.229 During his
speech, Trump alleged that the Maduro regime has not respected the “sovereign rights of its
citizens.”230 To support his assertion that Maduro’s government lacks genuine sovereignty,
Trump referenced Article 350 of the Venezuelan constitution, which vows that the Venezuelan
people will not submit to a regime that dispenses with democratic principles and fails to uphold
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human rights.231 Furthermore, Trump accused the Maduro government of interfering with the
fairness of elections, unjustly prosecuting political enemies, and undermining the rule of law.232
Although Trump did not state directly that a government’s failure to maintain fair elections and
the rule of law would result in its loss of sovereignty, his remarks imply his administration’s
claim that a government holds sovereignty only as long as it fulfills these conditions. That said,
Trump’s remarks and those of his administration in general, as well as other governments that
have endorsed Guaidó do not constitute an endorsement of the R2P doctrine with respect to
Venezuela.
The Lima Group, a coalition of the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Saint Lucia,
has also labeled Maduro’s re-election illegitimate.233 In the Lima Group’s declaration of support
for the Venezuelan National Assembly after Venezuela’s 2018 presidential election, its member
governments implored Maduro not to take office as Venezuelan president.234 The declaration
cited a breakdown in the democratic institutions of Venezuela, the rule of law, and governmental
respect for Venezuelans’ human rights as reasons for its support of the National Assembly as
opposed to Maduro’s administration.235 The Lima Group thus expressed the notion that
sovereignty demands adherence to inviolate responsibilities, the viewpoint implied in Trump’s
February 2019 speech about Venezuela. Unlike Trump, however, the Lima Group rejected the
prospect of international military action against the Maduro regime when it declared its support
for the National Assembly. Asserting the resolution of the Venezuelan crisis must arise from the
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actions of the Venezuelan people, the Lima Group condemned the use of military action against
Venezuela and throughout its surrounding region.236
With its opposition to the use of military force in Venezuela, the Lima Group’s stance
toward the crisis bears greater resemblance to Las Casas’s understanding of sovereignty and its
limits than does Trump’s more open-ended statements about resolving the crisis. Las Casas
recognized the sovereignty of Native American rulers, referring to them as legitimate authorities
within their societies, and he condemned any opposition to this perspective as heretical.237 He
did, however, support Spanish intervention in Native American societies to spread Christianity,
so long as that intervention remained focused on evangelization and was carried out
peacefully.238 Las Casas did not consider his support for evangelization in the Americas to
constitute a threat to native rulers’ sovereignty, as he did not call for the Spaniards to interfere
with the political institutions of the Native Americans. Therefore, the Lima Group’s outlook on
the Venezuelan crisis resembles Las Casas’s viewpoints concerning Spanish colonization
because the Lima Group disavowed the use of violence to resolve the Venezuelan crisis. Also,
the Lima Group did not frame its declaration on Venezuela as representing political interference
in Venezuelan affairs, just as Las Casas did not challenge the legitimacy of native rulers’
political authority within their jurisdictions.239
By leaving open the option of U.S. military action against the Maduro regime, Trump
differentiated his arguments from Las Casas’s understanding of sovereignty, for Las Casas
explicitly opposed Spaniards’ use of violence against Native American sovereigns and
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populations.240 Trump’s February 2019 comments on the Venezuelan crisis do share Las Casas’s
perspective that one country should not exercise political authority over another, a viewpoint
implied in Trump’s reference to the “sovereign rights” of Venezuela’s citizens.241 However, the
assertion that the Venezuelan people, not their rulers, hold supreme sovereignty in Venezuela
does not correspond to Las Casas’s writings on sovereignty, for the latter describes sovereignty
as belonging to the rulers of a people.242 Las Casas did not argue citizens or governmental
institutions should oust a sovereign ruler from power, in contrast to the United States’ support for
Guaidó’s attempted seizure of power from Maduro at the end of April 2019.243 Furthermore, Las
Casas alleged the Spanish monarchy had gained political authority over native peoples in the
Americas because the Pope had conferred that sovereignty on the Spanish ruler, and he did not
contend the Spanish had a right to overthrow Native American rulers on their own initiative.244
Las Casas’s belief that citizens and governments to have no right to usurp sovereignty
from rulers unilaterally aligns his views in part with the Russian and Chinese claims about
sovereignty in the Venezuelan crisis.245 The Russian government’s support for Maduro in the
wake of American, European, and Latin American recognitions of Guaidó as acting Venezuelan
President allows Russia to portray itself as a reliable defender of governments sympathetic to its
foreign-policy goals.246 In this way, Russia acts as a counterweight to the United States,
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positioning itself as a country that will support governments whose sovereignty appears under
threat, just as the United States has portrayed itself as a defender of Georgian and Ukrainian
sovereignty.247 Russia’s primary assistance to the Maduro regime has come through Russia’s role
as a lender of last resort for the Venezuelan government.248 Since 2006, the Russian government
and the oil company Rosneft have supplied the Venezuelan government with, at minimum, $17
billion worth of credit lines as well as loans to help the government’s finances remain solvent.249
The Chinese government has followed a similar policy of financing the Venezuelan government
with loans, though China has begun to scale back its economic aid to the Maduro regime as
Chinese economic growth has slowed.250 The debt Venezuela incurs to Russia makes it
financially lucrative for Russia to remain invested in the Maduro regime’s survival, and despite
its debt to Russia, officials in the Maduro government have welcomed the Russian engagement
in Venezuela.251 Venezuela’s Vice President, Tareck El Aissami, expressed his government’s
gratefulness to Russia for fostering the “best moment” for Russian-Venezuelan relations and for
“efficient political and diplomatic coordination . . . against the imperial siege and aggression
which Russia also suffers.”252 Thus, El Aissami depicted Russia’s support for the Maduro regime
as a struggle against foreign aggression that, according to him, threatens the sovereignty of both
Venezuela and Russia.
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Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has used similar rhetoric to justify his country’s
support for Maduro’s government, claiming the United States has obstructed the resolution of the
Venezuelan crisis and alleging that resolution must stem from negotiation between Maduro’s
regime and the opposition.253 Russian President Vladimir Putin has criticized external
interventions in Venezuela’s political affairs as well, urging the Venezuelan people be given the
opportunity “to decide by themselves the future of their country.”254 Following this vein of
thought and its interest in the survival of the Maduro administration, the Russian government
swiftly proclaimed its support for Maduro after Guaidó declared he was assuming the role of
interim president of Venezuela.255 On the one hand, Russia’s expression of support for Maduro
draws from the Putin administration’s desire to shore up Maduro’s government because of its
economic cooperation with Russia’s national interests and its critical perception of the United
States.256 This anti-American attitude on the part of the Maduro regime fits well with Russia’s
ambition to promote a multipolar world order, oppose American hegemony, and restore Russia
to great power status.257 On the other hand, Russian officials’ attempts to couch their support for
Maduro in terms of safeguarding Venezuela from foreign interference embodies Las Casas’s
concern that an external intervention in a society could have such negative effects as to
delegitimize that intervention.258
Like the Putin administration, the Chinese government also has represented the United
States’ involvement in the Venezuelan crisis as unjustified. When U.S. President Trump called
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for the freezing of Venezuelan officials’ financial assets and sources of funds for the Venezuelan
government held in the United States, the Chinese foreign ministry condemned Trump’s order
and labeled it “gross interference” in Venezuelan affairs.259 Moreover, Chinese foreign ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chunying demanded the United States cease exacerbating the turmoil in
Venezuela and refrain from interfering in what the Chinese government considers Venezuela’s
domestic affairs.260 Chinese State Councilor Wang Yi expressed his government’s rationale
about Venezuelan sovereignty further, urging that the citizens of each state decide the course of
their country’s domestic affairs, not foreign actors.261 He denounced the United States’
implementation of economic sanctions against the Maduro regime, averring such “external
interference” would worsen the Venezuelan crisis and “allow the law of the jungle to once again
run amok.”262 Furthermore, Wang insisted that the U.S. attempts to sanction the Maduro regime
would continue a history of “disastrous” interventions in states’ internal affairs.263 In so doing,
Wang echoed the Russian delegation to the UN’s 2016 statement about R2P, which noted how
political order in Libya collapsed in the aftermath of foreign intervention whose alleged purpose
had been to defend Libyan civilians.264
Wang’s remarks against U.S. policies toward Venezuela, while not sufficing for a
complete explanation of China’s motives for supporting Maduro, concur with Las Casas’s
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argument that rulers and peoples should not be exposed to foreign political or military
interference.265 Las Casas articulated this perspective when he insisted Native Americans could
not be subjected lawfully to the jurisdiction of any human judge for non-Christian practices they
carried out before converting to Catholicism.266 Although Las Casas’s writings on this topic did
not refer to state sovereignty as it is understood in twenty-first century international relations, it
espouses that one society should not intervene in the affairs of another society, save in limited,
nonviolent contexts.267 Las Casas did, however, consider the Christianization of Native
Americans more important than respecting the wishes of native rulers who might oppose such
religious intervention in their societies’ affairs, for he did not stipulate the Spanish should refrain
from evangelization in such instances.268 The Chinese Foreign Ministry has insisted a state’s
government be consulted before another government intervenes in its internal affairs, despite the
problematic nature of this stipulation in situations where a state’s government is perpetrating
human rights abuses. In contrast to this line of thought, Las Casas supported the evangelization
of Native Americans regardless of whether or not the Spanish obtained native rulers’ permission
to do so.269 He wrote the Spanish monarch had a duty to spread Christianity in Native American
lands, even in territories over which the Spanish did not exercise political control.270 By valuing
the spread of Christianity above any Native American sovereign’s position on the subject, Las
Casas foreshadowed the Lima Group’s position that the promotion of democracy is more
important than respecting the will of the Maduro government.271
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While Las Casas’s unwavering support for the promotion of Christianity in the sixteenthcentury Americas aligns with the Lima Group’s support for the promotion of democracy in
Venezuela, Las Casas shared the Russian and Chinese concerns for averting violent effects of
international intervention in Venezuela.272 His fervent denunciations of Spanish violence toward
Native Americas despite the perpetrators’ allegations of their legitimacy attests to his viewpoint
that the ends do not justify the means in international interventions.273 Las Casas, therefore, held
to a perspective on sovereignty that corresponds to the Russian comments at the UN General
Assembly regarding the international intervention in Libya. Just as the Russian delegation
insisted the Libyan intervention had been a disaster despite its initial, humanitarian justification,
Las Casas contended the Spanish intervention in Native American societies had been disastrous
regardless of its alleged motives.274
However, in situations where citizens are suffering and dying at the hands of their
government, as is occurring in Venezuela, the viewpoint that no political or military intervention
whatsoever is justified in another state’s affairs becomes immensely problematic.275 Failure to
intervene in such a situation would deprive the international community of a means that could
stem the human rights abuses in a country, which would likely continue to grow worse if no
action from the international community were taken. Moreover, international interventions,
whether they be of a political or a military nature, are not assured to intensify the suffering of a
country’s citizens. While an intervention may result in an exacerbation of the crisis it seeks to
resolve, such an outcome is by no means determined. Therefore, Las Casas’s repudiation of
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political and military interventions renders his arguments on international interventions too
restrictive regarding potential means for the international community to address abuses of human
rights. Vitoria’s acceptance of certain justifications for international interventions, while not
addressing human rights abuses as they are viewed in the twenty-first century, offers a more
flexible line of thought that is more morally and practically applicable to counteracting human
rights violations in Venezuela.276
Certainly, the diplomatic recognition that countries and institutions like the Lima Group
have extended to Guaidó and Venezuela’s National Assembly is not certain to lead to political
changes that will put a stop to human rights abuses in Venezuela. Nevertheless, such diplomatic
recognition offers the international community options for influencing the course of the
Venezuelan crisis other than using rhetoric alone to chastise the Maduro regime, a strategy that
would be extremely unlikely to incentivize a change in the Maduro administration’s behavior
regarding human rights. Despite these advantages of Vitoria’s legal thought, however, Las
Casas’s views remain important in that they underlie the potential for international interventions
to result in more harm than they correct.277 Thus, governments should seek to craft their political
and military modes of intervention so that, to the greatest degree possible, they avoid inflicting
suffering on citizens who are not involved in the governmental decision-making that has
promoted human rights violations. This mode of reasoning applies to policies such as the current
U.S. economic sanctions against approximately 100 Venezuelans who are closely connected to
the Maduro regime and against the Venezuelan government, state oil company Petróleos de
Venezuela, and national bank.278 Such policies offer governments a means to motivate officials
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in governments that are committing human rights violations to reverse their repressive policies,
but these policies should be considered carefully to minimize the prospect that their effects will
harm Venezuelan citizens who are not engaged in governmental decision-making. Although it
may not always be possible to avoid harmful effects of political or military interventions on
citizens who are not contributing to the perpetration of government policies that inflict human
rights violations, an avoidance of such harmful effects should accompany international
interventions. This admonition, which is in keeping with Las Casas’s views, illustrates his
arguments’ applicability to the Venezuelan crisis, despite the fact that his arguments against
international interventions in general – and their parallels in the arguments of Maduro, Russia,
and China – are morally and practically less favorable than those of Vitoria with respect to the
aim of counteracting human rights abuses.
VI: The Responsibility to Protect in Venezuela and Las Casas’s Views of Just War
During his speech to the United Nations Security Council on April 10, 2019, U.S. Vice
President Mike Pence invoked the principles of R2P with respect to Venezuela, without
mentioning the R2P doctrine by name.279 Labeling Venezuela a “failed state” and referring to
Maduro as “a dictator with no legitimate claim to power” who “must go,” Pence implied Maduro
has failed to fulfill his responsibilities to protect Venezuela’s human rights.280 Furthermore,
Pence contended that the international community should execute these responsibilities in
Maduro’s place, claiming the United Nations must “stand up for democracy and the rule of law”
in Venezuela.281 Thus, he couched his arguments in terms of concepts found in the 2005 World
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Summit Outcome, which declares “the international community . . . has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means . . . to protect populations from .
. . crimes against humanity.”282 Pence also claimed that the United States’ opposition to the
Maduro regime and support for Guaidó reflects an intent to advance democracy and protect the
rights of Venezuelans, not to advance U.S. interests in a selfish manner.283 These remarks are
reminiscent of the concept of right intention in just war theory, which urges states to begin wars
only when doing so promotes morally upright ends.284 By portraying the U.S. policy stance
toward Maduro and Guaidó as based on right intentions, Pence depicted the United States’
diplomatic and rhetorical intervention in the Venezuelan political crisis as not just morally
acceptable, but also necessary given the ongoing turmoil in Venezuela.
U.S. President Trump elaborated on his administration’s perspective that the United
States should influence the course of the political crisis in Venezuela during his speech in Miami,
Florida in February 2019.285 Trump claimed, “We seek a peaceful transition to power [in
Venezuela]. But all options are on the table,” reiterating a statement he issued in January 2019
when asked if he would support military action against Maduro.286 By not ruling out the pursuit
of U.S. military action in Venezuela, Trump implied such a policy decision would be a justifiable
means of bringing an end to the Maduro regime. Trump’s tacit acceptance of military action as a
policy option toward Venezuela resembles Sepúlveda’s acceptance of Spanish military action
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against Native Americans as justifiable for purposes of ending practices associated with the
polytheism practiced by indigenous peoples such as the Aztecs.287
At the cornerstone of Sepúlveda’s argument for the Spanish use of force against the
natives lay the claim that Native American practices that contravened natural law necessitated
Spanish intervention in their affairs.288 Sepúlveda assured Spanish military intervention would
“bring them [the natives] to spiritual health and the true religion,” even if that intervention
involved warfare, despite Sepúlveda’s lack of details regarding how military intervention would
lead to such “spiritual health”.289 Sepúlveda supplemented his argument with references to the
ancient Israelites’ use of military force against the Canaanites as described in the Bible, asserting
that such warfare was justified in the name of suppressing the worship of idols.290 The Trump
administration’s statements on Venezuela have not shared Sepúlveda’s emphasis on just war
theory given their lack of explicit references to military intervention, and the Native American
religious practices Sepúlveda condemned do not parallel the Venezuelan government’s policies
directly. However, Sepúlveda’s belief that Spanish military intervention to put a stop to
violations of natural law parallel the Trump administration’s unwillingness to rule out the pursuit
of military action in Venezuela. The Trump administration’s refusal to eliminate the possibility
of military action indicates its tacit assumption that an American overthrow of Maduro could be
vindicated in the name of ending the Maduro regime’s human right abuses and the suffering
Venezuelans face under Maduro.

Sepúlveda, “A Treatise on the Just Causes for War Against the Indians,” 104-105.
Ibid.
289
Ibid., 105.
290
Ibid., 103-105.
287
288

Clark 56
Like Sepúlveda, Las Casas agreed it was possible to justify certain wars in accordance
with just war theory of his day.291 Nevertheless, his indefatigable denunciations of Spanish
treatment of indigenous peoples in the Americas testify to his viewpoint that the intention to
counter perceived offenses against natural or international law does not justify unethical means
of doing so.292 This perspective underlies Las Casas’s condemnations of Spanish cruelty against
the natives, which he considered totally unjustified despite Sepúlveda’s efforts to couch the
Spanish conquest as a purgation of indigenous polytheism.293 Also, Las Casas rebuked the
conduct by which the Spanish had conquered territories in the Americas, not accepting the
insistence of conquistadores like Bernal Díaz del Castillo who claimed to have conducted
conquests on behalf of God and the enlightenment of the natives.294 Las Casas’s writings on this
subject reflect his concern for adherence to the just war principle of proportionality.295 According
to the principle of proportionality, military action can become illegitimate if the costs of a
military victory would outweigh any potential benefits to the intervening actor.296 The native
peoples of the Americas suffered massive loss of life from Spanish violence and the diseases the
Spanish unintentionally spread to them, and this loss of life serves as a poignant example of how
severe the costs of intervening in other societies’ affairs can become.297 Therefore, the concern
with evaluating the costs of military action illuminates Las Casas’s interpretation of the Spanish
conquests in the Americas, underlying his conviction that such conquests had been carried out in
a manner contrary to natural law.298
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Las Casas’s insistence that the effects of Spanish intervention in the Americas had been
detrimental to the natives is reminiscent of the critiques of potential U.S. military action in
Venezuela.299 In 2019, Congressman Ro Khanna of California urged U.S. policymakers to
“pause to ask” whether an intervention in Venezuela would “make a bad situation even
worse.”300 Khanna noted the “human suffering” and “financial costs” of previous U.S. military
interventions overseas and invoked the major likelihood that “chaos and bloodshed” would ensue
in the wake of a U.S. military assault on the Maduro regime.301 Like Las Casas, Khanna did not
argue for pacifism or a refutation of just war theory per se.302 Rather, he expressed that in order
for a military intervention to qualify as a just war, it not only would need to seek to counteract
injustices perpetrated by the target, but also would need to “begin an orderly transition to a new
regime” and “improve life for Venezuelans.”303 Thus, Khanna’s and Las Casas’s views parallel
one another on this issue, promoting the position that international intervention is not justified if
it deprives individuals of their inherent rights or violates natural law, even if an intervention’s
ostensible goal were to defend such rights or law.304 In situations where the political order within
a state has been rendered unjust because of human rights violations, however, international
interventions that adhere as closely as possible to the principle of proportionality offer the
prospect of counteracting human rights violations. Las Casas and Khanna’s arguments, while
rightly stressing the importance of proportionality, can be taken too far if they are used to reject
all political and military international interventions that have not received backing from a higher
international authority.
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The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect displays a perspective toward the
Venezuelan crisis that parallels Las Casas’s arguments about international interventions. The
Global Centre has claimed U.S. sanctions against Venezuela constitute a likely threat to
Venezuelans’ ability to obtain crucial goods, although Venezuelans’ access to key goods has
already been scarce and the most recent U.S. sanctions only target approximately 100
Venezuelans directly.305 Thus, the Global Centre shares Las Casas’s viewpoint that international
interventions must not harm the livelihood of the people they affect, even if such interventions’
ostensible aim is to resolve other societies’ crises. The Global Centre’s article on the Venezuelan
crisis follows up its comment concerning U.S. sanctions by calling on UN member states to
employ targeted sanctions that would harm only Venezuelan government officials who have
violated Venezuelans’ human rights, despite the difficulty of ensuring the sanctions would
impact only such officials.306
Continuing on, the Global Centre urges UN member states to ensure the measures they
take to pressure the Maduro regime do not “further limit the [Venezuelan] population’s access to
basic goods and essential services.”307 These statements illustrate the Global Centre does not just
call for sovereign states to uphold their obligations to protect citizens’ human rights. Rather, the
Global Centre also considers the international community must not violate human rights when
attempting to promote change in a government’s policies. Still, the status quo in a country like
Venezuela is not always preferable to a political or military intervention, for international
interventions may lead to increased suffering for a state’s citizens, but citizens who suffer human
rights abuses may not face realistic chances for improvements in their predicament from a
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continuation of the status quo. Therefore, Las Casas and the Global Centre’s mindset regarding
international interventions should be qualified by the notion that failure to intervene politically or
militarily in a case of human rights violations is likely to assure the continuation of the very
injustices Las Casas sought to avoid in international interventions.
The Global Centre’s mentality regarding intervention in Venezuela harkens back to Las
Casas’s arguments regarding the Spanish conquests in the Americas, for it shares his belief that
states have a responsibility to avoid the violation of legal and moral conditions that constrain
non-military interventions in other societies’ affairs. When Las Casas portrayed Native
Americans as “excellently fit to receive” Roman Catholicism, he indicated his perspective that
Spaniards were justified in their attempts to convert the natives, and he did not condition this
viewpoint on native rulers’ willingness to permit Christian evangelism in their territories.308
Describing “a good Christian man” who felt “moved by pity” to convert natives on a Caribbean
island most of whose population had died of European disease, Las Casas attested to his notion
that the Spanish had a responsibility to spread Christianity in the Americas.309 His writings
advanced the viewpoint that non-military interventions in other societies must remain focused on
their ostensible justifications and must not pursue unjust courses of action.310 While Las Casas’s
concerned himself with the Spaniards’ obligations to preach Christian doctrines, not twenty-firstcentury concepts of human rights that the Maduro regime has violated in Venezuela, his views
show similarity to the notions of the R2P doctrine, which serves as an evolved manifestation of
international legal principles Las Casas invoked.

Las Casas, “Destruction of the Indies,” 6.
Ibid., 7.
310
Ibid., 1-8.
308
309

Clark 60
Another way in which Las Casas’s arguments foreshadow the perspectives of Ro Khanna
and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect comes from Las Casas’s denunciations of
the manner in which the Spanish intervened in Native American societies. Las Casas focused
much of his ire against Spaniards who received encomiendas – grants of Native Americans’
forced labor and tribute allocated to a Spaniard in exchange for a pledge to convert the natives to
Christianity.311 Las Casas depicted encomenderos, as those who held encomiendas were called,
as hypocrites because they claimed they would spread Catholicism to the natives, but their
actions revealed the majority of them were in fact “avaricious and filled with vice,” according to
Las Casas.312 By labeling these Spaniards’ conduct toward the natives as unjustified, Las Casas
argued international interventions must be predicated on more than just a claim of good
intentions if it is to be considered truly just. He even contended that the natives “always waged
the most just and defensible war against the Christians,” maintaining polities and societies have a
right to defend themselves against an intervening force, particularly if the intervening party’s
ostensible aims serve as a cover for unjust motives.313 This standpoint places Las Casas in line
with the notion from just war theory that combatants must have “right intention” when waging
war, and that they cannot rightly use force if they seek self-aggrandizement and not the
resolution of injustice and harm.314 Therefore, Las Casas disapproved of attempts to justify uses
of force through concealments of underlying, unjust motives, just as Chávez disapproved of the
possibility for R2P to become a convenient justification for preemptive attacks based on
governments’ political, economic, or military ambitions.315
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VII. Final Analysis and Conclusion
If the governments that have declared their support for Guaidó had sought to justify their
actions in Venezuela with the authorization of a higher international authority like the United
Nations, as occurred during the Korean War (1950-1953), their means of action would have
better approximated Las Casas’s perspective on international interventions. After all, Las Casas
described Pope Alexander VI’s decision to grant the monarch of Castile spiritual authority over
the Americas as a legitimate act, portraying it as having granted proper sanction to Spanish
colonization and evangelization in the Americas.316 Therefore, Las Casas believed one
government could influence the internal affairs of another country, so long as that influence
remained limited to a spiritual intervention or had the approval of a higher international
authority.317 Las Casas never condoned the usurpation of a ruler’s political authority by another
sovereign acting without papal authorization.318 He contended the Spanish should not interfere
unilaterally to usurp the political authority or property rights of Native American sovereigns, and
he considered native authority and property rights inviolate under natural law.319 Not only did he
condemn violent attempts to subjugate Native Americans to Spanish rule, but he also wrote
native rulers and peoples could not be punished if they chose not to accept the Spanish monarch
as their sovereign lord, even if they converted to Catholicism.320 This stipulation testifies to Las
Casas’s lack of support for international interventions in which one government would try to
pressure another government to submit to its political will or would interfere in the internal
politics of another country without its government’s consent.
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Las Casas qualified his recognition of Native American rulers’ sovereignty with the
assertion of supreme papal authority over the peoples of the world and his belief that the Spanish
monarchy wielded just authority to propagate Catholicism in the Americas.321 Although he
portrayed papal authority as higher than that of Native American rulers, he represented native
rulers as legitimate authorities within their territories and did not characterize the papal
authorization of Spanish colonization as a delegitimization of native rulers’ sovereignty.322 When
Las Casas spoke of the authority figures in Native American societies whom he claimed could
wield sovereignty, he referred to kings and lords who, according to him, had a right to govern
because of their noble status.323 Las Casas’s notion of sovereignty as extending from the top
down in Native American societies differentiates him from the positions of governments that
back the Venezuelan opposition today. For example, Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez’s
comment that the Venezuelan people must decide the country’s future implies the Venezuelan
people hold the highest sovereignty within their country, which extends from individual citizens
to their representatives in the National Assembly.324 This concept would have been unimaginable
in Las Casas, Vitoria, and Sepúlveda’s day, seeing as these Spaniards lived too long before the
emergence of Enlightenment liberalism to share the perception that the citizens of a country
wield ultimate sovereignty, not their rulers. Likewise, the Lima Group insisted the Maduro
regime must restore democratic government in Venezuela and recognized the National Assembly
as Venezuela’s legitimate political authority because its members were elected democratically.325
Las Casas, in contrast, did not describe the populations of a state as exercising a higher authority
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than its rulers. Even if he had done so, he opposed unilateral interferences in Native American
polities’ political affairs.326 Las Casas believed the Spanish lacked sufficient authority to
influence the government of another society except through Christian evangelization or the
nonviolent assumption of political authority in keeping with papal authorization.327
Given Las Casas’s views regarding the importance of preserving rulers’ sovereignty from
external interference that was not sanctioned by a higher international authority than the state,
the governments that seek to influence the political situation in Venezuela through their support
for Guaidó are not in keeping with Las Casas’s views on international interventions.328 Granted,
U.S. Vice President Pence’s speech on April 10, 2019 and the Lima Group’s call for Maduro to
forfeit a second term as Venezuelan president and assert the sovereignty of the National
Assembly, which is just as much a part of the Venezuelan government as Maduro’s executive
branch.329 These statements express governments’ support for one side in the Venezuelan
political crisis over another, an inevitable development that motivates governments’ involvement
in the Venezuelan crisis and the diplomatic recognition many governments have extended to
Guaidó. Such calls for Maduro to step down and diplomatic recognitions of Guaidó do not
conform to Las Casas’s opposition to intervention in political affairs of a sovereign polity that
has not been sanctioned by a higher international authority.330 Also, the appeals to an implicit
higher law that appear in the statements of governments that support Guaidó, while reminiscent
of Las Casas’s appeals to a natural law, refer to those governments’ support for democratic
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values and institutions, rather than the notion of natural law and papal authority to which Las
Casas ascribed.331
These considerations reveal Las Casas’s arguments concerning international intervention
do not lend themselves well to the means by which the coalition of countries that support Guaidó
have attempted to influence the political crisis in Venezuela. However, Las Casas’s emphasis
that governments must protect the population over which they rule lends itself to ongoing
concerns over the Venezuelan government’s policies toward its citizens. Given the differences
between Las Casas’s historical context and the historical context of the ongoing Venezuelan
crisis, Las Casas’s notions of protecting citizens does not correspond exactly to twenty-first
century interpretations of human rights.332 After all, the responsibility to protect that underlies
the arguments of NGOs like Amnesty International and the Global Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect stems from the argument that governments have a responsibility to uphold justice
toward their citizens, as Las Casas articulated in his Brevísima relación.333 Las Casas’s belief
that the Spanish should preach Christianity to indigenous peoples in the Americas lends itself to
a parallel between his views of international interventions and the more secular views of twentyfirst-century NGOs.334 Just as these NGOs consider the international community to have a
responsibility to promote human rights in Venezuela, Las Casas considered the spread of
Christianity an important goal for the Spanish to undertake, believing Christian evangelization
would benefit the natives and justifying it even if the Spanish were to lack political authority in
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indigenous peoples’ lands.335 This underlying religious component of Las Casas’s perspective on
international responsibility distinguishes him from twenty-first-century NGOs and governments
that make secular arguments about international responsibility toward Venezuela. Nevertheless,
Las Casas held to the viewpoint that certain efforts by governments and international institutions
– in his case, the Spanish monarchy and the Roman Catholic Church – are justified in promoting
certain sociopolitical goals in foreign sovereigns’ territory.336 In the twenty-first century, this line
of thought extends itself to the viewpoint that states and international organizations can justly
espouse human rights in other countries, operating under the principle that these rights are both
desirable and of crucial importance globally.
Thus, Las Casas’s arguments share a parallel assumption with the arguments of NGOs
like Amnesty International and governments that support Juan Guaidó’s claim to the Venezuelan
presidency, such as the United Kingdom.337 These NGOs and governments believe certain
political and social goals – particularly the promotion of human rights as they are viewed in a
Western, twenty-first century sense – are so crucial that governments and international
organizations have a duty to advance them in countries where human rights are at risk amid
political violence.338 Las Casas’s views paralleled this line of thinking in part, since he
considered the Spanish monarchy to have a duty to promote the spread of Christianity in
indigenous sovereigns’ territories.339 However, his writings did not advocate policies that would
support rival factions in another country’s political crisis or seek to enact political change in a
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way that he believed would cause individuals more harm than benefit.340 Las Casas’s depiction
of a Spanish massacre of civilians in the Aztec capital of Tenochtitlán serves as a case in point.
In 1520, Pedro de Alvarado, the lieutenant of Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés, led a group
of conquistadores in an attack on unarmed citizens of Tenochtitlán during a religious festival.341
The Spaniards had attempted to overturn the polytheism of the Aztecs by burning Aztec idols
and placing an image of the Virgin Mary in the city’s great temple.342 While Las Casas could
have construed the Spaniards’ actions, particularly the Spanish destruction of Aztec religious
images, as justifiable means to promote his desired ends of the natives’ Christianization, he
harshly condemned the Spaniards’ treatment of the natives instead.343
This example illustrates Las Casas’s view that international interventions in the political
and social affairs of other societies are not necessarily justified because their ostensible aims
align with goals one might perceive as universally desirable. In order for international
intervention to be justified, according to Las Casas, an international authority above an
individual state should provide permission for intervention to begin.344 In Las Casas’s view, that
authority resided in the papacy, and in the context of the Venezuelan crisis the United Nations
would serve as a parallel international authority.345 In the case of Venezuela, the prospect of
official UN support for intervention in Venezuela is extremely unlikely given Russia and China’s
ability to veto any potential UN Security Council condemnations of Maduro’s regime and its
human rights abuses. The lack of official UN sanction for governments’ endorsement of Juan
Guaidó lends itself to the conclusion that governments’ unilateral assertions of Guaidó’s
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legitimacy do not correspond to Las Casas’s arguments about international interventions. Las
Casas opposed policies that exacerbated a politically tense situation and resulted in atrocities
against civilians, such as the Spanish massacre under Alvarado’s leadership.346 Given that
governments’ support for Guaidó has not led to a resolution of Venezuela’s economic crisis or
political turmoil, Las Casas likely would have viewed such support with skepticism since the
political tensions in Venezuela have remained severe throughout Guaidó’s bid for the
Venezuelan presidency.347
In conclusion, Las Casas’s views illustrated the notion of proportionality in international
interventions and the admonition that such interventions be predicated on justification from a
higher international authority. Las Casas’s support for proportionality is especially applicable in
the case of the Venezuelan crisis. International involvement in the Venezuelan crisis, particularly
through governments’ diplomatic recognition of Guaidó, U.S. economic sanctions against
Venezuelan officials, and the unlikely prospect of U.S. military intervention in Venezuela,
should be taken in a form that does not inflict harm on Venezuela’s citizens. Rather, such
involvement in the crisis should be predicated on a goal of pressuring the Venezuelan
government to alleviate its human rights abuses without worsening the plight of Venezuelan
citizens. Las Casas’s denunciations of unjust Spanish treatment of Native Americans during the
sixteenth century lend his arguments about proportionality in international interventions to the
Venezuelan crisis well, for proportionality should underlie all international efforts at intervention
in the Venezuelan crisis. The prospect of military intervention in Venezuela stands a particularly
unclear chance of improving the situation in that country for Venezuelan citizens, and any
potential military action has not endured the scrutiny that just war theory would demand with
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respect to a war’s likelihood of achieving its aims.348 Thus, military action at the present time is
not an advisable strategy to address the crisis in Venezuela, although it could be justified if it
were carried out with respect to proportionality, stood a likely chance at alleviating human rights
violations, and served as the principal, viable option for resolving the crisis.
Despite Las Casas’s views’ applicability to the principle of proportionality, his views
concerning the need for a higher international authority to justify international involvement are
problematic with respect to the Venezuelan crisis. The authorization of an international body
other than a state’s government, such as the United Nations Security Council, would provide a
helpful sense of legitimacy to an international intervention in Venezuela. However, the extreme
unlikelihood of such authorization occurring renders it crucial that intervention in the
Venezuelan crisis be pursued by other means, for the international community should seek to
pressure the Maduro regime to change its course of action with respect to human rights in
Venezuela. By demanding that international interventions be predicated on a higher international
authorization than that of a state’s government or that of a coalition of states, Las Casas’s
articulation of the justifications of interventions is too limiting for the context of the Venezuelan
crisis.
Given this weakness of Las Casas’s argument and his limiting renunciation of
international interventions of a political and military character, Vitoria’s arguments in favor of
certain political interventions should be coupled with Las Casas’s arguments about
proportionality and applied to the Venezuelan crisis. Unlike Las Casas, Vitoria did not argue
international interventions had to receive approval from a higher international authority than the
state to be legitimate, so long as they were conducted in accordance with natural law.349 His
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acceptance of justifications for political interventions applies well to the Venezuelan crisis, in
which governments’ diplomatic recognition of Guaidó has served as an attempted means to
promote political change in Venezuela that stands a change of resulting in an alleviation of
human rights abuses in that country. With these factors in mind, a combination of Las Casas’s
views regarding proportionality in international interventions and Vitoria’s views in favor of
justifications for certain international interventions that do not have to possess the blessing of a
higher international authority enjoy excellent moral and practical applicability to the Venezuelan
crisis. Therefore, the strategies that best exemplify these principles, such as the extension of
diplomatic recognition to Guaidó and political and economic support to the Venezuelan
opposition, have greater moral and practical applicability to the Venezuelan crisis than efforts
such as military intervention, whose impact on the Venezuelan crisis is not only uncertain, but
likely to lead to harm for Venezuelan citizens. For this reason, Sepúlveda’s arguments regarding
Spanish colonization in the Americas, which focus so strongly on Spanish military interventions
against Native American societies, have less applicability to the current Venezuelan crisis than
do those of Las Casas and Vitoria. Moreover, Sepúlveda lack of attention to proportionality, in
comparison to Las Casas and Vitoria, renders his writings more morally and practically
questionable than Las Casas and Vitoria’s views regarding international interventions. Without
sufficient attention paid to proportionality, Sepúlveda’s writings do not take an adequate account
of the prospect that international interventions can worsen the plight of citizens who are suffering
human rights violations if they are not carried out in a way that is proportional to the abuses they
seek to address.
Although the diplomatic endorsement Guaidó has received from more than fifty countries
has not produced an end to the crisis nor the Maduro regime’s human rights abuses, the
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diplomatic recognition of Guaidó has allowed governments to do more to affect the course of the
crisis than just condemn Maduro. Moreover, continued international support for the Venezuelan
opposition is important because it maintains the diplomatic pressure on the Maduro regime,
illustrating that the regime will face diplomatic repercussions for its continued abuses of human
rights. While this prospect does not guarantee a resolution of the Venezuelan crisis, it allows
countries to strike a middle tone between merely denouncing Maduro and launching a risky and
not-well-analyzed military intervention in Venezuela. By promoting the Venezuelan opposition’s
efforts to produce political change in Venezuela, governments and international organizations
can strike a balance between totally refraining from international intervention in the face of
human rights abuses and engaging in international intervention that may not exhibit the
proportionality that Las Casas and Vitoria championed. While governments’ recognition of
Guaidó does not align with Las Casas’s arguments in general, it does not contradict Las Casas’s
arguments in favor of proportionality and is in keeping with the argument that a combination of
Las Casas and Vitoria’s views enjoys the greatest applicability to the Venezuelan crisis.
This thesis’s analysis of the parallels between Las Casas’s writings and international legal
arguments against the Maduro regime’s legitimacy illustrates how Las Casas’s political thought
can help scholars better understand the international legal arguments employed in the current
Venezuelan crisis. Also, the misalignment between Las Casas’s views and the tactics of
governments that have recognized Guaidó as Venezuela’s president offers a timely case study of
how certain themes of sovereignty and sovereigns’ responsibilities have evolved and even eroded
over time and align imperfectly with twenty-first-century notions of the responsibility to
protect.350 Certainly, the nearly five centuries of difference between the historical and political
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contexts of Las Casas’s day and those of the ongoing Venezuelan crisis call into question
dogmatic pronouncements of whether or not Las Casas personally would have approved of
various international actors’ arguments and behavior concerning the political tensions in
Venezuela. Still, the document’s comparison of Las Casas’s views on international interventions
with those of present-day governments and organizations provides a helpful historical,
philosophical, and theoretical context for discussions of international legal arguments that pertain
to the Venezuelan crisis. More importantly, the thesis demonstrates the value of Las Casas in
current efforts to establish norms and guidelines for international interventions with respect to
the Venezuelan crisis.
Moreover, Las Casas’s views on international political interventions offer an alternative
approach to answering questions of when, in what ways, and for what reasons countries have the
right and the obligation to intervene in other countries’ political crises. Questions on this matter
not only drive further understanding of Las Casas’s views on international interventions of his
own time, but also encourage a more critical perspective regarding present-day arguments that
favor or oppose the political aims of Guaidó and Maduro. In particular, Las Casas’s emphasis on
a state’s need to obtain higher international authorization before asserting its political authority
outside of its territory remains relevant to international controversies like the Venezuelan crisis.
The presentation of Las Casas’s views on international authorization for interventions lends itself
to international legal, prudential, and ethical questions about the extent to which present-day
international authoritative bodies, such as the UN Security Council, should have a say before
governments provide diplomatic or economic support to politicians in other countries,
particularly during times of political turmoil in such countries.
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The thesis’s findings about Las Casas’s political thought and the extent to which his
perspectives align with present-day notions of sovereignty and the responsibility to protect can
contribute to scholarly and political discourse about unique means by which governments and
NGOs could alter their present policies toward Venezuela. Finally, the study of Las Casas’s
political thought in the context of the Venezuelan crisis invites scholars to posit new questions
about the degree to which Vitoria and Sepúlveda’s political arguments show parallels with the
responsibility to protect and can be applied to current international crises. Thus, the thesis serves
to stir additional scholarly investigation of the historical precedents for international legal
arguments that are pertinent to crises in which individuals are at risk for potential crimes against
humanity. Such research can spur more critical analysis of present-day international legal
arguments and offer additional insights into the political thought of international legal scholars of
the past.
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Appendix
Sepúlveda’s Political Arguments
•

Sepúlveda considered the indigenous peoples of the Americas naturally inferior to the
Spaniards, employing the writings of Aristotle to support this notion.

•

He espoused the Spanish conquest of Native Americans, regarding it as an effective
means to subject indigenous peoples to an allegedly superior tutor.

•

He viewed the papal grant of political authority over the Americas to Holy Roman
Emperor Charles V as legitimate, and he considered Spanish military action against
Native Americans as a legitimate exercise of this authority.

•

Moreover, Sepúlveda believed the Spanish had a responsibility to use military force to
put an end to offenses against natural law, particularly human sacrifice.

•

Sepúlveda also thought the Spanish had the right to use military force against Native
Americans to prevent them from continuing to practice non-Christian religions and
spiritual traditions.
Las Casas’s Political Arguments

•

Las Casas’s critiques of all attempts at political or military intervention in Native
American societies drew from his repulsion at the Spaniards’ abusive treatment of native
peoples.

•

He argued the Spanish government did not have the right to intervene militarily or
politically in Native American societies without the authorization of the papacy.

•

Furthermore, Las Casas considered Native American rulers the legitimate political
authorities within their societies, believing the Spanish had no right to wrest authority
from them unilaterally.
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•

Also, Las Casas’s rejected military intervention even if its goal was to stop human
sacrifice, intending to avoid a situation in which an intervention might cause more
suffering than it would succeed in stopping.

•

Las Casas instead championed peaceful evangelization in the Americas, condemning the
offenses against natural law carried out during the Spanish conquests of the Caribbean
and the Aztec Empire.
Vitoria’s Political Arguments

•

Unlike Las Casas and Sepúlveda, Vitoria rejected the notion that the Pope could confer
sovereignty over Native Americans on Charles V.

•

He promoted the idea that states are sovereign over their own affairs and should not be
subjected to military intervention or political interference in their affairs because of
religious differences.

•

Also, Vitoria disapproved of military interventions to protect non-Catholic peoples within
a foreign sovereign’s territory.

•

However, Vitoria disagreed with Las Casas in that he considered military intervention
legitimate if it protected international trade rights and rights of communication.

•

Finally, Vitoria believed the Spanish had the right to intervene in another state militarily
to support Catholics who wished to replace their ruler with a Catholic sovereign.
Arguments that Align with Sepúlveda

•

The R2P doctrine’s justification for military intervention in a state for the purpose of
halting human rights abuses aligns quite well with Sepúlveda’s arguments in favor of
military intervention to prevent human sacrifice.
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•

U.S. President Trump’s threat of military action against Venezuela, while not
exemplifying the R2P doctrine per se, implies military interventions are an acceptable
means to produce political change in a country and thus avert more violations of human
rights by the target government.

•

While Sepúlveda grounded his arguments in favor of Spanish military intervention
against Native Americans in religious arguments and notions of natural law that do not
align exactly with twenty-first century notions of human rights, his views on this subject
serve as precedents for the rationale behind the R2P doctrine.

•

Ironically, despite this similarity between Sepúlveda’s thought, the R2P doctrine, and
more general justifications for humanitarian intervention, Sepúlveda’s overall political
thought has not received as much support as that of Las Casas or Vitoria; after all, he
defended his views with arguments that alleged Native Americans were inherently
inferior to the Spanish.
Arguments that Align with Las Casas

•

Las Casas’s opposition to Spanish military intervention in Native American societies,
even for the purposes of putting an end to human sacrifice, aligns his views more closely
to the arguments of Maduro, China, and Russia than do either Sepúlveda or Vitoria.

•

The reasons for which Las Casas opposed unilateral Spanish attempts to influence
indigenous peoples’ politics by non-military or military means reflect his concern for
avoiding potential harm such outside influence might inflict on innocent individuals.

•

Also, Las Casas’s viewpoint approximates the argument Ro Khanna made in his article
rejecting U.S. military intervention against Venezuela, portraying such an intervention as
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a violation of the principle of proportionality, which calls for military action to not
produce harm that exceeds the wrongs it is meant to address.
•

Las Casas’s support for the notion that sovereigns have inviolate responsibilities toward
the populations they govern aligns with the arguments of governments and international
organizations that oppose the Maduro regime because of the regime’s violence toward
civilians and its violations of Venezuelans’ human rights.
Arguments that Align with Vitoria

•

Vitoria’s political thought strikes a balance between the arguments of Sepúlveda and Las
Casas in that Vitoria outlines a set of limited justifications for political and military
intervention in a state’s affairs.

•

Of these three Spaniards, Vitoria aligns the closest to the predominant understanding of
international interventions’ proper place in the international system prior to the
development of the R2P doctrine in the wake of the Rwandan genocide and the Balkan
wars of the 1990s.

•

By portraying international intervention as intended to halt infringements on international
peace and security, such as unjustified restrictions on international trade, Vitoria’s
political thought parallels the perspective that international interventions should not be
employed if offenses against natural law or human rights were restricted to the citizens of
a single country.

•

While Vitoria did not espouse political or military interventions against governments
solely because of their abuses of citizens’ human rights, he did promote an early notion of
popular sovereignty in that he believed a country’s population had the right to invite
foreign intervention if they wished to be governed by a Catholic ruler.
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•

Thus, Vitoria’s arguments exhibit similarities with the claims of governments and
international organizations that assert the Venezuelan people, not Maduro, wield ultimate
sovereignty and have the right to seek a different political path for their country.
Ethical and Practical Merits of Sepúlveda, Las Casas,
and Vitoria’s Arguments in the Venezuelan Crisis

•

While Sepúlveda’s views advocate military action to put a stop to violations of natural
law, his racist attitude toward Native Americans and his espousal of international
intervention as punishment for natives’ religious views renders his arguments morally
inferior to those of Las Casas or Vitoria.

•

Sepúlveda’s arguments could be employed to justify military action in the name of
compelling one culture to adopt the practices or beliefs of another, a prospect inconsistent
with international principles of human rights.

•

The suffering that is replete among Venezuela’s citizenry and the violations of human
rights by the Maduro regime, including its killing of protestors and crackdowns on the
political opposition, demand an international response.

•

Las Casas’s rejection of political or military interventions for humanitarian purposes
renders his views on interventions less morally desirable than Vitoria’s acceptance of
political interventions that aim to correct violations of natural law, for the international
community should not sit idly by while Venezuelans continue to suffer abuses of human
rights.

•

However, Las Casas’s views do offer morally and practically helpful insight into the need
for right intentions behind international intervention in Venezuela, as well as the need for
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such intervention to have a realistic chance of promoting political change or punishing
violators of human rights in Venezuela.
•

For example, it is unclear that military action against the Maduro regime would resolve
the political turmoil in Venezuela, and such action might even worsen the situation in
Venezuela.

•

Thus, Las Casas’s arguments can serve to draw scholars and politicians’ attention to the
need for reflection and restraint when addressing options for intervention in Venezuela,
with the aim of minimizing Venezuelans’ suffering to the maximum possible degree.

•

At the same time, Vitoria’s arguments lend themselves better to the prospect of
alleviating Venezuelans’ suffering overall, for Las Casas’s opposition to political and
military interventions deprived his arguments of means that may be needed to correct
violations of human rights if a country’s internal crisis only continues to worsen.
Conclusions

•

The means by which governments that support Guaidó have attempted to influence
political developments in Venezuela do not align with Las Casas’s arguments, although
their arguments about the responsibilities of sovereigns do align with Las Casas’s
arguments.

•

Vitoria’s political thought aligns best with the means by which governments have
supported Guaidó, for his views in favor of a form of popular sovereignty in which the
population of a state can appeal for a new ruler parallel the arguments that the
Venezuelan people hold sovereignty over Maduro, not the other way around.

•

Also, Vitoria’s arguments align more closely with the principles of just war theory than
do Las Casas’s views, for while Las Casas indicated the importance of proportionality in
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constraining the use of force, he did not afford the justifications for military action that
Vitoria employed in accordance with principles from just war theory.
•

Las Casas’s, Vitoria’s, and Sepúlveda’s views are important to the Venezuelan crisis
because they provide parallels that can help scholars better contextualize and understand
the arguments that the Maduro government, the Venezuelan opposition, and governments
on both sides of the crisis have used to support or oppose international intervention in
Venezuela.

•

Also, in the context of the Venezuelan crisis both a potential military intervention and
further economic sanctions against the Maduro regime would need to have clear goals for
achieving their intended aims and realistic prospects for successfully counteracting the
human rights violations in Venezuela, a difficult goal to achieve through sanctions
targeted at government officials.

•

Thus, Las Casas’s views on proportionality provide a better practical and moral argument
for the importance of ensuring sanctions and potential military action do not inadvertently
exacerbate the suffering in Venezuela, compared to Vitoria’s views.

•

At the same time, Vitoria’s views on self-determination and justifications for political
intervention in humanitarian crises offer a better moral argument than Las Casas’s views
when it comes to counteracting abuses of human rights.
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